

# ROMANIA'S ENTRANCE INTO NATO

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General studies

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## ABSTRACT

ROMANIA'S ENTRANCE INTO NATO by Major George M. Pelesteanu, 136 pages.

The end of the Cold War and the significant social and political changes from the central and eastern European countries created a great opportunity for an improved security environment in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area. Initiated in response to the new security architecture, the 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* established the principles and conditions to be accomplished by candidate states in order to become a full member of the alliance. With Romania as case in point, this thesis uses a comparative method for analysis of the extent at which candidate states from the 2004 wave of enlargement were prepared for NATO integration. The accomplishment of entrance conditions was then compared with candidates' strategic attractiveness in order to establish which of these rationales weighted more in the balance for Romania's entrance into NATO. The analysis of historical issues and reasons that determined Romania to seek for NATO acceptance constituted the foundation of the attempt to answer the primary question: Did NATO accept Romania as a full member based on accomplishment of entrance preconditions or on strategic rationale? The results of the evaluation process revealed that other aspects, such as political implications, have to be taken into consideration for the analysis of an aspirant state for NATO membership.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The many reforms, initiatives and programs agreed . . . are the beginning of a transformation process essential to guaranteeing the security of the territory, populations and forces of NATO members against all threats and challenges.

NATO Office of Information and Press,  
NATO after Prague

#### Background

Rooted deep in its multimillennial history, Romanian national consciousness was hardly preserved, due to its geographical position and implicit interest of big powers from Europe and Asia in its territories and natural resources. Many times in its existence in Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic territory of considerable strategic significance, Romanian people had to endure attacks coming from east (numerous nomad hordes and Russian troops), from south (Ottoman Empire), from west (Austrian-Hungarian Empire), which resulted in long periods of foreign control. Under these circumstances Romania did not have the opportunity, or the necessary military capabilities to fulfill the biggest dream of Romanian people: to unite all Romanians in one country.

Territorial integrity and national identity were always sensitive issues and the most important objectives of Romanian internal and external politics. Given the size of the country, the economical and military power, together with its geographical position (between three empires: Tsarist, Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman), Romania was forced to resort to military alliances and/or security related treaties to ensure its territorial integrity and independence. Nonetheless, the Russian territorial ambitions over

Bessarabia (part of Moldova-one of the Romanian principalities), which was taken from the Turks in 1812, and Habsburgs' pretension over Transylvania, led to the situation in which despite the sacrifices from the World War I (WWI) the Great Romania (see figure 3) was kept only till the beginning of the Second World War II (WWII).

After the Second World War, the two biggest military powers split Europe in two parts separated by ideological and political divisions. As a result, the countries from Eastern Europe fell under the influence and dominations of the Soviet Union. In order to counter any risk that Soviet Union interests' extent would pose, in 1949, twelve countries from both sides of the Atlantic ocean formed an alliance called North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), committed themselves to help each other in case of an aggression against any one of them.

With the obvious intent to counter the perceived threat posed by NATO and to support its military interests in the Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union established in 1955 the Warsaw Pact or Warsaw Treaty, officially named Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.<sup>1</sup> As did NATO, the Warsaw Pact established the conditions, terms, members and their commitment to defend each other, if one or more of the members were attacked. At the same time, the treaty stated that mutual non-interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty and independence will constitute the basis of relations between members.

The Soviet Union's size, economic capabilities and sheer military power enabled the establishment of its communist ideology over the Central and East European countries, placing them on the other side of western democracy. However, the existence

of the Soviet Union and its military power was considered a serious counterpart for the Alliance, influencing in this way the preservation of peace by balancing the forces.

Considering this situation as a positive one, from an ideological point of view, most of the socialist European countries used this aspect for reasoning their decision to join the Warsaw Pact. In a number of cases, such as Romania, the decision to follow the Soviet Union in a military coalition was solely a political decision taken by the communist regime. Nevertheless, the balance of power contributed to peace preservation, but did not provide a secure and stable social environment over the European continent.

The period of time between 1946 and 1989 was characterized by various conflicts among the Soviet Union and the Western democracies particularly because of the Soviet influence over the East European states. This situation led to an “iron curtain” descending through the middle of Europe and to the estrangement between Western and Eastern European countries. This period known as The Cold War, was a period of competition, tension, arms race and “proxy wars” fueled by mutual perception of hostility between the two major alliances.

Given the global political complexity of the situation and the increasing western influences over the Eastern European countries’ populations, the Soviet Union viewed the Warsaw Pact, as the best instrument to preserve its interests and influence in Eastern Europe. Concurrently, the communist leaders in Eastern European countries felt that their position was threatened by soviet influence. When the Soviet Union violated one of the most important provisions of the Pact (noninterference in internal affairs) in both Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) its credibility and influence were considerable damaged in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union was forced to reconsider its

external affairs policy. As a result, strategic arms limitation agreements and increased peaceful coexistence were outcomes of summit meetings between the United States and Soviet Union in the early 1970s.

The relaxation of East - West tensions reduced the level of “threat” perceived by Eastern European countries and commensurately the need for Soviet protection. This situation led the Soviet Union to the position from which it could not point to the danger of imperialism posed by the western countries. Moreover, the internal frictions weakened the unity of the Warsaw Pact and increased the reluctance of Eastern European countries to continue to believe in the treaty’s relevancy.

As a consequence, in late 1980s, after becoming General Secretary of (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev admitted, at the Party Congress in 1986, that there are real differences among Soviet allies regarding opinions on issues concerning collective defense policy. Taking these considerations as a great opportunity for promoting their national interests, the Warsaw Pact member states reconsidered the Soviet Union’s influence and concentrated their attention towards internal ideological and political issues. This might be considered the starting point for all the major changes in Europe.

The fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe brought up major political changes, which led all European countries to review their military, economic and external political posture. Even if the revolutions in most of the Central and Eastern European countries did not bring any pressure arising from an external danger or threat, all of these countries expressed their aspiration to integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The integration process in one organization or another is politically complex and economically difficult, and it requires more than

anything broad and extensive reforms in most of the organizational structures of the candidate countries.

Considering the reasons for NATO enlargement process are stretched from the generosity of the collective security system, through accomplishment of acceptance conditions or regional stability, as far as geo-strategic advantages, the purpose of this research is to determine which of these rationales weighted more in the balance for Romania's entrance into NATO. If the entrance of new members into the Alliance was still a complex political problem because of reasons like Russia's opposition to enlargement, or technical reasons, such as command and control interoperability or deployment capabilities, it became clear that NATO enlargement and development of military relations, created to facilitate the accession process, were responses to the new security environment from the Eastern half of Europe.<sup>2</sup> The issues related to Romania's acceptance into NATO refers to her old status as a Warsaw Pact member, historical relations with Russia and how could they influence NATO decision-makers, and Romania's commitment to Peace Support Operations and reforms adopted in order to become a full member. Subsequently, the extent in which Romania's strategic position and her role as a stability provider in the Balkan Peninsula have constituted an important factor in NATO's decision making process, will represent the main point of this thesis.

The end of the Cold War and implicitly, the disappearance of the main enemy (threat)--The Warsaw Treaty--have risen the question: Can NATO still demonstrate the rationale of its existence? The newly created conflicts around the globe, and the need for a response to altered situations, have proven the necessity of such an organization, but a different one, with a new structure and new objectives in order to cope with today's

challenges determined mainly by the changes from Central and Eastern Europe. Under these circumstances, when the Cold War was over and the European security situation was completely changed, NATO members realized that the request of the new emerging post-communist states to join the alliance had to be seriously taken into consideration. The problem of this research is to establish if the consequences of non-acceptance and strategic positions offered by new candidate states influenced NATO enlargement process, more than accomplishment of entrance conditions.

### Research Question

This thesis will analyze the facts that led NATO decision-makers to choose Romania as a NATO member. It will address the historical relationship with Russia and analyze Romania contribution to Warsaw Pact, in order to present an overview, as realistic as possible, of the external policy principles Romanian leaders applied in connection with defense and sovereignty issues. The facts presented will provide the reader with a better understanding of the events that took place in the period of time when Romania was a Warsaw Pact member. At the same time, it will present the reasons which lead Romania to decision to ask for becoming a NATO member.

The primary question of this thesis is: “Did NATO accept Romania as a full member, based on entrance pre-conditions accomplishment, or on strategic rationale?”

Secondary questions to answer are shown below:

A. What were the reasons which determined Romania to seek for NATO membership?

B. To what extent did Romania meet the principles and pre-requisites for becoming a NATO member country?



C. What, if any, strategic/geopolitical advantages could led to Romania's entrance into Alliance?

### Assumptions

The following aspects related to the new security challenges brought by the end of the Cold War and NATO's transformation process and its evolution--especially in the last decade of the twentieth century--are to be considered relevant for the research process:

1. Romania-Russia historical relations did not influence Romanian people's option for joining NATO and EU. Rather it constituted a way of expressing commitment to embrace the democratic values and breaking off the contacts with communist past.
2. After the fall of the communist rule throughout the Central and Eastern Europe, Russia's role as a major international player has been significantly reduced.<sup>3</sup>
3. Although under the strong influence of the communist ideology, people from the former socialist countries were willing to embrace the same values NATO promoted.
4. The last 10 years of the twentieth century was a decade of transformation determined by significant social, political, military and economic changes--especially in the Central and Eastern Europe--which led to the conclusion that NATO has changed from a military-political oriented organization into a political-military oriented organization preserving peace, stability, and promotion of democratic values.
5. After 1989, besides the transformation objectives, NATO concentrated efforts on responding to the security needs of former Warsaw Pact members and other European non-allies, by developing programs meant to facilitate their integration process.<sup>4</sup>
6. According to provisions of "The 1995 Study on NATO's enlargement," by integrating new members, the benefits of common defense will protect the democratic

development of those specific countries and will contribute to the extent of freedom and security.<sup>5</sup>

7. At the Prague Summit in November 2002--a major milestone in Alliance's history--by a consensus through political--military consultation, NATO members agreed on the change from a collective defense focused policy to a full investment in military capabilities needed to react beyond the NATO boundaries, which implicitly led to the decision of continuing the enlargement process.

8. Providing only a number of guidelines, which will be addressed in chapter III and IV, without fixed pre-established criteria for acceptance, NATO will develop the enlargement process on a case-by-case basis, specific to every one of the candidate states, through a gradual and transparent process. The Allies will decide by consensus according to their judgment, for each of the aspirants, if they will be invited or not to join the Alliance.<sup>6</sup>

9. The attacks from 9/11 brought to the front the need for a common defense against terrorism. However, it is difficult to assert that these events have influenced NATO's enlargement process.<sup>7</sup>

10. Within the assessment process of the candidate states, one of the most important factors of the strategic attractiveness is represented by the capabilities offered by the aspirant countries, for power projection. Considering that, although the 9/11 events have "introduced a great deal of uncertainty into the strategic calculations," the Balkans will continue to be the most important theater of operations for NATO.<sup>8</sup>

### Definition of Key Terms

The explanation of the following terms is considered important for a clear understanding of the issues presented in this thesis:

Alliance. The result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives which further the common interests (Joint Pub 5-0 2003, II-21). In this thesis is used for both, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact.

Balkan Peninsula. A European peninsula which includes the following countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Monte-Negro, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey (Europe).

Central and Eastern Europe. From a geographical point of view, the following countries are considered to be in central and Eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Monte-Negro, Romania, Albania, Macedonia and Bulgaria.

Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (FM 1-02, Sep 2004)

Cold War. A state of political conflict using means short of armed warfare.

Communist Bloc. A group of socialist countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe where the leading party was a communist party.

De-Stalinization. Khrushchev's intent to denounce the arbitrariness, and terror of the Joseph Stalin era and to try to meet the material needs of the Soviet population.

European Union. Founded on 9 May 1950, it was an agreement between European countries, based on trade and economic relations. Today it represents a family

of democratic European countries working together for peace and prosperity. It also promotes citizen's rights; freedom; security and justice; regional development; environmental protection and other.

Membership Action Plan (MAP). A NATO initiative presented at the Washington Summit in 1999, which materializes NATO's "open door" policy. It was established mainly to assist candidate states in their preparation for acceptance. The countries analyzed in this thesis will be the MAP states before 2004 wave of NATO enlargement: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, which are presented in figure 1.




Figure 1. 2004 NATO Enlargement

Source: NATO on-line library, NATO enlargement [NATO web site]; available from [http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/html\\_en/enlargement01.html](http://www.nato.int/docu/enlargement/html_en/enlargement01.html); Internet; accessed on 15 February 2006.

Partnership for Peace Program (PfP). Launched in January 1994, is a program of bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO.

Proxy Wars. Wars fought by Soviet allies rather than USSR itself.

Prerequisites (Conditions) for Acceptance into NATO. A set of condition to be met, in following domains: political reform (democratization, economic reform) market economy, relations with neighbors, treatment of Ethnic Minorities, democratic control of the military, NATO interoperability and defense planning.

Romania. A state located in the Balkan peninsula in Southeastern Europe (see figure 2) with a total area of 91,670 square miles (237,500 square kilometers). It borders Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine. The 23 million inhabitants include Romanians (89.4%), Hungarians (7.1 %), and Germans, Serbs, Gypsies and others. Romania was the first country to sign the PFP program; it became NATO member in March 2004 and is looking for EU entrance in 2007.



Figure 2. Map of Central Europe

Source: Romanian Official Travel and Tourism Information, 1998 [database on-line]; available from <http://www.romaniatourism.com/maps.html>; Internet.

Strategic Objectives. Multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives attained using multinational resources.

Second Wave of Enlargement. NATO's initiatives of enlargement process which completed the acceptance of seven new European countries into Alliance (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia)

Warsaw Pact. A military alliance of the Eastern European Soviet Bloc countries. The treaty was drafted in 1955 and signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955. The country members were: Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

### Limitations

The complexity of an organization, like NATO, raises many difficulties when it comes to analyzing processes which, by multinational, military, and political aspects, bring to the fore the importance and necessity of confidentiality. The declaration of military capabilities was always a sensitive issue for both nations and NATO. These considerations will limit the depth of analysis of military, economic and political preparedness for entrance of NATO candidates, but will not hinder the development of a relevant, overall picture of NATO's enlargement.

The overall purpose of this work is to establish the extent at which Romania accomplished NATO's preconditions, comparing them with the evaluation results obtained by the other MAP states. The assessment of some of the NATO conditions (such as: democratic-style civil-military relations) will be difficult to realize in a mathematical manner, with concrete results needed for facilitating the evaluation process. However, the

results of the method used by Thomas S. Szayna in assessing the candidate states presents sufficient relevancy and will be used in this thesis.<sup>9</sup>

Another caveat in assessing the level at which the MAP states are meeting NATO guidelines is represented by the fact that the guidelines are purposely vague, in order to provide the possibility for every state to adjust the integration programs' objectives, to the specificity of their own political, military and economic situation. Therefore, the methods used in this paper will address capabilities expressed as much as possible in figures and facts--presented in published sources of information--valid for all the candidate states.

The capability of the new member states and candidates, related to their contribution to the Alliance, raised numerous and various controversies, especially because of the possible increase of security expenditures of the old NATO members. Therefore the assessment of the aspirants, though the decision might be considered a political one, constituted an important military aspect and an economical one as well. This shows the importance and the difficulty at the same time, of the establishment of entrance conditions and of the procedures and measurement units that should be used. Under these circumstances, for a better relevancy, the evaluation process of Romania's preparedness for joining the Alliance will be developed by comparison with all the other states searching for NATO's acceptance in the second post-Cold War wave of enlargement. Being focused on Romania's case, this paper will not address the historical aspects or the political ones of the other MAP states, nor the social conditions which determined the other nations to look for NATO integration.

In conclusion, although the access to information related to detailed military capabilities will be hindered by the confidential characteristic of this kind of data, the amount of information provided by Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), interviews taken to Romanian officials and realistic and objective opinions expressed by military or political analysts, as much as Internet data, facilitated the development of an effective analysis.

### Delimitations

Although the phases of the NATO enlargement process comprised of the entrance of more than one state into the Alliance (most of them being in almost the same political, military and economic situation), this thesis will be focused on Romania's assessment and acceptance process.

The analysis of this paper will use the results of Szayna's assessment process based on data provided by Rand Corporation, Freedom House, and *The World Factbook*, which will construct a relevant image of the capabilities of the nine MAP member states. For economical data the assessment of European Union will be used, based on the fact that from economical point of view, NATO and EU acceptance conditions are the same, considering their common purpose in promoting the same market economy principles.

The figures and data used for the assessment process represent 2000-2002 period of time. Since all evaluation results might be different or easily changed, data provided by Szayna's analysis will be considered relevant, especially because between 2002 and 2004 (the year of Romania's acceptance) no significant modifications took place.

This paper will not address the political issues, which might in fact, be less relevant due to the formal aspect of declarations and the restricted access to NATO



decision-making process related to the enlargement. Therefore the analysis does not have an objective from what was the decision-making process looking like, or from revealing aspects never known before. Rather it will provide the reader with data and information, in order to allow one to draw one's own conclusion over the issues presented herein.

### Significance of the Study

This thesis will reveal significant political and social aspects of Romania's membership on Warsaw Pact, focusing on its relations with former Soviet Union, by presenting issues that determined Romanian people's will to embrace democratic values and to take the decision to adhere to North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Further on, the research development will emphasize the importance of NATO enlargement process for building and maintaining a stable and secure environment in Central and Eastern Europe. The research on this proposed topic, which is actually a strategic one, will represent also a good opportunity for personal creative thinking and critical reasoning development, and consequently, will offer a possible pattern in analyzing a candidate state for NATO acceptance.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, and the events that followed, demonstrated that the reason the Alliance was founded is not the reason for its today's existence. Thus, the research on this topic will show that NATO's enlargement process is not developing in a direction towards Russia or against Russian interests. The analysis provides hindsight over the continuously changing security environment in the Central and Eastern Europe, which have significant implications on defense planning related to enlargement process and NATO's responsibility in the area.

The complex situation from post-World War II Central and Eastern Europe, presented in background, created by Russia's influence in the region, led to a period of more than forty years of communist rule, which did not bring a secure environment, but generated numerous internal social frictions and disapproval of Soviet leading role within the Warsaw Pact. Based on assumptions related to significant changes from the former communist ruled countries and NATO's transformation process, this thesis will use the information gathered and presented in the literature review to provide the reader with an idea about why the NATO enlargement process was initiated and how it was developed for acceptance of MAP countries from the 2004 wave of accession.

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<sup>1</sup>The state members were: Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

<sup>2</sup>Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: managing European security in the twenty-first century" in *Almost NATO: Partners and players in Central and Eastern European security*, ed. Charles Krupnik (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003).

<sup>3</sup>Nina L. Khrushcheva, "Russia and NATO: Lessons learned," *NATO after Fifty Years* (Scholarly resources, Inc., 2001), 238.

<sup>4</sup>Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the Twenty-first Century" in *Almost NATO: partners and players in Central and Eastern European security*, ed. Charles Krupnik (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 17.

<sup>5</sup> For details read, *NATO Handbook*, [article on-line NATO web site]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm>; Internet; accessed on 30 September 2005.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement: Assessing the candidates for Prague* (The Atlantic Council of the United States bulletin, vol. XIII, No.2, March 2002), 2.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas S. Szayna is a political scientist at the Rand Corporation, whose work on assessing the candidates for NATO acceptance will be used in the analysis of this thesis.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research is to establish the most important aspects which led to Romania's admission to NATO, based on analysis of historical aspects and strategic and security issues, as well as NATO transformation process. The written materials in this realm are voluminous, first because the Cold War was and still is a very interesting subject for many political, historical, ideological and military researchers. Second, NATO is a complex and powerful organization which presents both, political and military characteristics. Third, the events that occurred in recent years, in the former Soviet Union and Europe, were significant and brought important political, economic and social changes. Therefore, NATO represented a provocative topic particularly for political and military analysts.

The research for this thesis relies on non-classified sources and published works. The second source of information was material available through the Romanian Ministry of Defense, in particular in 2004 interviews. The ministers of defense, secretary of state and chief of general staff have strong opinions about Romania's military system transformation for NATO integration.

Since the formation of a realistic and objective opinion about Romania's admission into NATO is the most important element of the analysis' framework, this author will cite statements of NATO officials on different occasions, such as summits or seminars, to construct an overall picture of the international security issues influencing their decisions relative to the enlargement process. News articles, along with military and

political analysts' opinions expressed in articles published in different periodicals provided valuable insights on NATO's challenges. Finally, the Internet provided timely and updated information.

The literature review is organized on three topics: Romanian history; Romania integration into NATO, and NATO's past and present objectives. These topics are too complex to be covered completely in this thesis; therefore one must restrict the presentation of facts and data, to only those relevant to the research question.

### Romanian Historical Issues and Regional Security Environment

This review of historical and security issues will focus on three topics: Romania's territorial integrity and regional security; Romania as a Warsaw Pact member and Romanian society under the communist regime.

#### Territorial Integrity

Martyn Rady (1992) stated that Romania is one of the oldest nations in Europe. The people's origins are Latin due to the fact that in the second century Romanian ancestors were conquered by the Roman Empire. Romanians have lived in the same area for many thousands of years (see figure 3), and as Rady notes are extremely sensitive to territorial integrity issues.<sup>1</sup>



Figure 3. Great Romania (1920-1940)

Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia [image on-line Wikipedia web site]; available from :[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Romania\\_1920.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Romania_1920.png); Internet.

This sensitivity to territorial integrity is the most relevant, because it influenced most of the significant events from the medieval, modern and contemporary history of Romania. Another important aspect of Romanian history is that despite the fact that Romanian people had a common history, the same Christian religion and spoke the same language, they were split administratively in principalities and regions according to the will of different occupation powers or negotiations between them (see figure 4).



Figure 4. Romanian Regions

Source: Romania LCM [HTML document web site] ; available from: <http://drugoon.8m.com/lcm/ro/romania.htm>; Internet.

Romanian-Russian relations were considerably influenced by Russian interests in some of the Romanian territories, especially in the twentieth century. This thesis will provide a few relevant historical moments starting with World War I.

Romania joined the First World War in 1916 as a result of help promised by Entente powers, consisting of follow-on military support. However, the aid was never provided and the Romanian Army had to face alone the combined forces of the Germans, Hungarians, Austrians and Bulgarians. After Russia's collapse in 1917, Romania had to look for peace with Germany and Austria, who claimed the Romanian territory of Transylvania. Considering that Romania's resistance against the spread of Bolshevism from Russia constituted a protective wall for Western Europe, the allied negotiators supported Romanian territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference, and the 1920

Romanian map had the shape and structure shown in figure 3. Nonetheless this was not a permanent solution. In June 1940, as the result of a deal between Hitler and Stalin, the Romanian territory of Bessarabia was annexed to Soviet Russia.<sup>2</sup> In the same year, in September, by provisions of the Vienna Diktat, Romania lost Transylvania too.

Even if claims for Romanian territories were coming from both directions, east and west, one of the best Romanian politicians of the time--Take Ionescu--declared at a conference, before Romania joined WWII, that the most significant threat is represented by Russia's interests.<sup>3</sup> Most written works about the events leading up to WWII describe the extremely complex political situation for Romania. Joseph Harrington (1991) summarizes the problem of Romanian territorial disputes: "Hitler's rapid invasion of France, and Italy's belated declaration of war against Paris, prompted the Soviets to seize their promised lands in Romania. On June 26, 1940, the Soviets demanded the return of Bessarabia and the cession of Northern Bucovina from Bucharest."<sup>4</sup> This seizure was actually the result of the negotiations under the Non-Aggression Pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov at the beginning of the Second World War. Despite the fact that Romania entered the war to salvage its national territories, the negotiations at the end of the war did not solve the territorial dispute. Besserebia and Northern Bucovina remain from Romania to this day.

One might consider the presentation of territorial disputes as irrelevant for the purpose of this thesis. However, territorial disputes and more than four decades under the communist rule constituted significant obstacles to the free and democratic development of Romania. These factors are relevant to at least three NATO's entrance conditions:

political and economic development; treatment of minorities and relations with neighbors.

### Regional Security Issues

In early 1990s, a transformation from collective defense to collective security, gave Central and East European states the opportunity to reconsider defense strategies in areas not covered before: defense diplomacy and regional and multinational cooperation. While the possibility of an external attack tended to be nil, defense policies had to be focused on protecting the people, supporting the newly created political regimes and ensuring democratic principles.

At the same time, the collapse of the Eastern Europe communist governments permitted the emergence of security crises in areas around Romania. The outbreak of civil war in the former Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts in Transnistria were two serious conflicts which might have dragged Romania into disputes.

The Hungarian historical claim to the Romanian territory of Transylvania and Hungary's declared long-term aim of self-administrating government and autonomy for Transylvanian Magyars, constituted another dangerous situation. The weak stability of the region produced by the social and political changes from the early 90s aggravated the problem, but Hungary took no concrete actions to change the borders or reclaim territories.<sup>5</sup>

Besides the possible internal conflicts or territorial disputes, nonconventional threats to national security are most likely to manifest. Jeffrey Simon (1998) presents Central and Eastern European countries' concerns about security problems arising from



open borders, such as: illegal migration, arms and drugs smuggling, and organized crime.<sup>6</sup>

The new security challenges imply a demand for transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, as well. The Central and Eastern European countries' institutions are not the only ones which had to transform, but the western security structures had to change too. NATO for instance, taking into consideration the new Central and Eastern Europe, had to solve two simultaneous problems in terms of adapting itself to new requirements: an internal restructuring process and an enlargement toward the east, in order to overcome the instability provoked by nationalism and regional conflicts.<sup>7</sup>

#### Romania and the Warsaw Pact

The second aspect of history important as background to Romania's admission to NATO is Romania's participation in the Warsaw Pact or as it was called in 1955--Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. In March 1948, facing the need for economic reconstruction and concerned about Soviet policies and methods, five Western European countries-- Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom-- established, the Brussels Treaty, which later on, with the added of the United States, Canada and other European countries, led to the signature of the Treaty of Washington, in April 1949.<sup>8</sup> Even though the Soviet political ideology constituted a threat to the western moral values or to democracy itself, its military power contributed to the preservation of peace by establishing a balance of powers. This fact might be taken as a positive one. Thus, the ruling parties from the former socialist European countries used this aspect to argument their decision to join the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, the Soviet political aims

and methods for reaching them constituted the main reason for the events that would later occur at the end of the 1980s in Eastern Europe.

Soviet influence after WW II, when many of the Russian troops were stationed on Romanian territory, caused a new political movement to emerge under the Soviet control and support--communism. According to Ion Calafeteanu (1997), the political activists rapidly gained the support of the laborers in the cities and of the peasants from the country, by shadowing their repressive methods with populist ideology.<sup>9</sup> Since the current of communism was spreading fast over the Eastern half of Europe, the Soviet Union used the Warsaw Pact to increase its influence and create favorable conditions for future military and economic benefits. At the beginning of the coalition, Romania was a faithful and trusted member for the Russians, as the most active ally in the 1956 Hungarian uprising.<sup>10</sup>

Eventually, it became more obvious that Soviet external politics, and its military interventions, were not meant to support the Pact's principles but to violate them. Raymond L. Garthoff (1995) in his publication "When and why Romania distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact" presents how Romania ceased to actively participate in the alliance's initiatives and launched itself on a separate path, through a secret approach to the United States government in October 1963, disregarding its treaty obligations under the Pact but not actively challenging the Soviet Union. He states this process began at the same time as or was generated by, the Cuban Missile Crisis when no country wanted to be forced to enter a nuclear war because of Soviet missiles in Cuba.<sup>11</sup>

Another aspect which considerably affected the Warsaw Pact's cohesion was determined by Soviet internal policy within the Alliance, presented by Glenn E. Curtis'

“Czechoslovakia: A country study” (1992). He explains the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries’ dissatisfaction (strongest on the Romanian side) related to having a subordinate of the Soviet minister of defense placed over the East European defense ministers in the Warsaw Pact hierarchy. This demonstrated once again Soviet leaders’ intentions to gain an overall control in the Alliance, in order to support their national interests. Perhaps the most important issue that pointed out Romania as a “Maverick member” within the Warsaw Pact was its decision to demand the withdrawal from its territory of all Soviet troops, advisers, and the Soviet resident representative. This measure was not the only one by which Romania expressed its disapproval of Soviet politics. The refusal to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was equally important. When Romanian politicians publicly stated that the invasion was not only a violation of the Warsaw Pact's cardinal principle of mutual noninterference in internal affairs, but a violation of international laws as well, this clearly defined Romania’s position in relation to Soviet external policy methods.

According to Dennis Deletant’s opinion (1998), beside its political and military positions, Romania adopted economical and financial initiatives, such as adherence to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) or International Monetary Fund and World Bank.<sup>12</sup> Romania's commercial position was further enhanced after acquiring preferential trading status with the European Common Market in 1973, the differences between the Soviet led community principles and western values. Alex Alexiev’s opinion expressed in his work--“Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The defense policy of a reluctant ally” (1979) offers the best conclusion: “The Romanian deviation has negatively affected

Soviet maneuverability on the Pact's South-Eastern flank and may seriously compromise a Warsaw Pact effort in the future.”<sup>13</sup>

### Romania Under the Communist Regime

The differences between Romanians' way of life before and after the communist party came into power represents one of the main issues for the research question. The hard times between 1947 and 1989, characterized by lack of freedom, liberties and information, secret services' control over the population and the paranoid political leader's cult of personality made the Romanian people consider the Revolution of 1989 as a great moment to get rid of communism and return to the democratic and free way of life.

The emergence of the communist party in Romania is related to foreign interest in Romanian territories, which did not allow Romanian society to develop as a unified people into one country. In 1940 German decision gave Transylvania to Hungary. A subsequent Churchill-Stalin agreement designated Romania as a Soviet zone of influence. Under these circumstances Romanians looked for support from powers which could assure its cultural and territorial integrity. Despite modern influences from France and the United Kingdom, the only power which guaranteed its territorial integrity was Germany, on the condition that Romania supports its campaign against Russia.<sup>14</sup>

Romania's political class was successful in keeping the country (and the rest of Europe too) away from the Soviet communist influence in the interwar period. Nonetheless, at the end of WWII, Russia annexed Romanian territories of Bessarabia and North Bucovina, together with significant war repairs paid by Romania. Moreover, Soviet

influence in Romanian political internal affairs fostered a climate that permitted the emergence of communism.<sup>15</sup>

At the beginning the communist party did not present a lot of appeal in Romania, but the events from 23 August (the day Romania turned the weapons against Germany), gave the communist leaders an opportunity to take advantage of the unstable situation and to organize a coup d'etat. The Romanian King's initiative to build up a political coalition to face the communists had to be abandoned because of Soviet threats to Romania's sovereignty.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, with significant Soviet support, the communist leaders managed to impose themselves on the Romanian political arena.

The following period was one of industrialization and of communist designed modern development. The alert and forced rhythm of modernization drove to decrease of life quality and was considered one of the main reasons for Romania's today poverty.<sup>17</sup>

The economic development plans of Romania, as they were adopted by the Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR)--Nicolae Ceausescu, were deeply rooted in the Soviet model based on centralized control and far from an effective market economy. This model was applied during 1970s and 1980s and led to a significant decline in per capita GDP resulting in widespread dissatisfaction.<sup>18</sup>

Additionally, Ceausescu's desire to be the object of a cult of personality curtailed freedom of expression and lowered the quality of art works. For instance, in those times there was no book published without reference to Ceausescu's intellectual guidance.<sup>19</sup>

The burdens of the communist way of life, including the insatiable demand for praise of the political ruler, Ceausescu's frantic desire to repay the national debts, and human rights abuses reached their apogee in late 1980s. As a result the Romanian

Revolution arose bringing liberty and the possibility of reorienting the society towards democratic values. Had the Romanian people not been in the way of Russian territorial ambitions, and had they had more support from the Western European countries, their fate would probably have been a totally different one.

### Romania and NATO Integration

The end of the Cold War and the communist regime represented for most Eastern European countries the fulfillment of a 40 year old dream--freedom and the possibility of embracing real democratic values. The European Union (EU) and NATO were two of the most important symbols of democracy in the world. All the Eastern European countries were aware of the fact that there were some requirements to be met before they could enter these organizations. For Romania, NATO membership represented a crucial issue for its security policy and implied the need for significant reforms of the armed forces' structure and their roles in a new international and internal environment.

As NATO's Secretary General has stated in his speech at the NATO conference on 4 February 1997, "Despite the long and difficult transition, Romania remains firmly on course on its internal democratization. It also remains on course in its relationship with its neighbors and Europe more generally."<sup>20</sup> As Liviu Muresan stated, some of the restructuring process objectives were depolitization of the army, education of politicians about the country's new defense issues and the reorganization of the command and control system.<sup>21</sup>

"Romania's engagement in sub-regional co-operation and the national strategy for NATO accession" is an interesting analysis made by Adina Stefan (1999), who presents a dual commitment of Romanian foreign policy: pro-NATO orientation, and regional co-

operation. The latter was developed in four directions: bilateral agreements with neighbors, trilateral co-operation schemes, sub-regional security and economic relations and participation in programs for future membership in NATO and EU.<sup>22</sup> Further, she presents several risks Romania has to face, such as cessation of NATO enlargement and increased Russian opposition. These risks have serious implications like the possible rise of ultra nationalism or creation of disputes between members and non-members. A simple analysis leads to the conclusion that the only solution is NATO membership. In spite of difficulties, such as economic losses resulting from the embargo on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania continues to demonstrate to NATO membership its commitment by developing viable programs oriented on both political and military objectives.

Raymond A. Millen (2002), in “Tweaking NATO: the case for integrated multinational division,” develops an analysis level of the NATO members and NATO candidates, in terms of the interoperability needed for creation of multinational divisions, with increased capabilities in terms of training, deployment and sustainability. His conclusion about most of the former Warsaw Pact members’ armed forces is that they are poorly trained (especially pilots), badly equipped and inadequately funded. In his opinion these aspects will significantly influence the NATO enlargement process.<sup>23</sup>

Mark A. Meyer presents a realistic overall assessment of a candidate state for NATO admission.<sup>24</sup> The author proves to be completely familiarized with NATO’s entrance conditions and a connoisseur of Romania’s social, political and economic situation. He analyzes the integration issue from three points of view. First, he presents the strategic implications of the acceptance, second he shows that the Romanian people

share the same values as all NATO members, and third he directs the attention to remaining issues to be solved.

From the strategic point of view, Mr. Meyers considers that there were geographic and military reasons to admit Romania and Bulgaria to NATO, especially after 9/11, because both of them will provide significant help for building a coalition against terrorism. Further, he presents Romania's efforts and commitment to most of the Peace Support Operations, including OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom), where it proved to be a proficient and reliable ally. At the same time Romania would provide strategic coherence to NATO by linking Central Europe with Greece and Turkey in the south, enhancing the stability and security in this part of Europe. Subsequently, Romania will interdict the flow of organized crime and terrorist activities coming from central Asia and the Caucasus into Europe. Finally, Meyer reveals Romania's good relations with its neighbors, presenting the common advantage of Greece and Turkey brought by Romania's acceptance into NATO, in terms of completion of security in Europe's southern dimension.<sup>25</sup>

Regarding the political and social dimensions, Meyer shows that, in spite of questions raised concerning Romania's commitment to the shared values of NATO member states, there is a pluralistic democracy where people are free to speak, to assemble, to worship as they please or to petition their government. The treatment of ethnic minorities, he affirms, is a model for other countries in the region, which contributes to internal and regional stability.<sup>26</sup>

Although there are a set of conditions to be met in order to become a NATO member, when it comes to analyzing a candidate state prior to its acceptance, several



supplementary criteria may be as essential. The assessment process is much more complex than just a technical or mathematical one. The political, economical or strategic security considerations can have a bigger importance, in the assessment process than a practical (measurable) one. However, the extent at which every candidate state is prepared for NATO acceptance in terms of specific capabilities is relevant for the Alliance's members interests related to costs of enlargement process and aspirants capabilities to bring a military contribution to NATO.

In this respect, the project "Civic self-assessment of the NATO membership potential" developed an evaluation process by initiating debates on issues concerning NATO enlargement. It informed about the products resulted from workshops where the nine MAP states, Czech Republic, as a new NATO member and Ukraine, as a future possible candidate took part. The assessment presented the level of readiness and challenges met in domains such as political or economic reforms, relations with neighbors or treatment of minorities.<sup>27</sup>

Another interesting assessment of states looking for NATO membership was developed by United States General Accounting Office (GAO) as a report to Congressional Committees. The collection of data and analysis of the information was conducted between July 2001 and October 2002, based on documentary evidence provided by different organizations on political, economic, defense, budgetary, information security, and legal issues in the light of NATO's Membership Action Plan's objectives.<sup>28</sup>

One of the most concrete evaluations of the aspirant states was provided by Thomas S. Szayna in his book "NATO Enlargement: Determinants and implications for

defense planning and shaping.” Mr. Szayna’s work applies an analytical framework for assessment of the candidate states’ level of preparedness for NATO integration, comparing the results obtained by the MAP states with those of the previous accepted nations and some European countries with significant political and economic capabilities which did not express the wish to join the Alliance. The mathematical manner in which Mr. Szayna used figures provided by different rating companies such as Freedom House, SIPRI Yearbook or the CIA’s World Factbook, revealed the possibility of an exact assessment of aspirants’ capabilities. The relevancy of the assessment process stems from the comparison between candidate countries’ level of preparedness for NATO integration and the strategic attractiveness presented by every aspirant state.<sup>29</sup>

Larry L. Watts, in his article “Romania and NATO: the national-regional security nexus” displays a detailed assessment process, proving that it is almost impossible to create an evaluation pattern which can be used for all situations and all candidate states.<sup>30</sup> He presents facts and figures about economic performance, defense allocations and manpower evolution or defense expenditures. Further, he enumerates the Peace Support Operations in which Romanian troops were involved and population support for NATO integration. The article presents external political issues, like relations with neighbors, the fight against organized crime, or terrorist activities. Also, internal political issues like treatment of ethnic minorities, human rights or fight against corruption are presented. At the same time Watts allocates significant attention to aspects like US President Bill Clinton’s visit to Bucharest for a strategic partnership with United States, after Romania and Slovenia received only special mention for invitation to NATO enlargement at the end of Madrid’s conference. In his conclusion, Mr. Watts speaks of Romania’s post

communist security policy and how it was oriented to NATO integration and regional cooperation. Considering Romania's commitment to operations all over the world and its willingness to embrace and share democratic values, Watts stated that even if Romania's geo-strategic position was a well-known fact, the terrorist attacks brought it to the fore.<sup>31</sup>

### NATO's Past and Present Objectives

There is no doubt that North-Atlantic alliance was a subject for thousands of political or military analysts, but also historians, sociologists and economists. Interest was mainly because of its great worldwide implications on all of life's aspects, such as economical, religious, military, social or moral values.

The final topic addressed in the literature review was focused on two main issues relevant for the thesis' research process: NATO's transformation and the enlargement process. When the treaty was signed on 4 April 1949, it created an alliance of ten European and two North American countries committed to defend each other against an external military threat. Three more joined the Alliance in 1952 (Greece, Turkey and Federal Republic of Germany) and Spain in 1982.

Since the creation of the Alliance, during more than one-half of a century, the core mission of NATO was to ensure defense capabilities and a secure environment for its members. It has a political branch responsible for taking the necessary decisions, which must be unanimously accepted, and a military one which includes several commands and different subordinate headquarters in Europe and North America.<sup>32</sup>

NATO was established mainly to discourage an attack from the Soviet Union against Western Europe, considering the rivalry that had developed between the two super powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and their allies. Later

on this rivalry have evolved in to a harsh arms race and masked conflict of interests known as the “Cold War.”<sup>33</sup>

Besides the communist aggression deterrence, another important purpose of the Alliance was to keep the peace among former enemies in Western Europe by making them members in the same alliance, preserving and fostering a climate based on democratic values. This was the main reason for all the former communist countries to look for and to reach the North-Atlantic Alliance, in two waves of enlargement process, which raised the number of members to 26.

Stanley R. Sloan in his article “Continuity or change” claims that NATO’s survivability stems from its allies’ capacity to adapt the relationships, principles, fundamentals and objectives to changing international circumstances, despite the difficulties and challenges that a transformation process can bring.<sup>34</sup> He asserts that the 1999 Washington Summit did not answer all the questions about NATO’s future role and missions, but it brought to attention some of the new challenges the Alliance will have to face and presented aspects of continuity and change that have risen up in the past decade of the twentieth century.<sup>35</sup> The strongest points that support NATO’s continuity came from the values of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law shared by the people and governments from all member countries. As history has demonstrated to us, it took several decades for the people from countries under Soviet communism to liberate themselves through large, and in some cases, bloody and harsh mass movements.

During the last one-half of the twentieth century many events that threatened the world peace, such as Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the relaxation of East-West relations from the 1970s and 1980s, have influenced the political

map of Europe, and implicitly NATO's policy. The events that determined the most significant changes in the Euro-Atlantic structure and objectives were the end of the Cold War and the Revolutions from Central and Eastern Europe.

Steven L. Rearden, in an article titled "NATO's post-Cold war strategy. The role of Combined Joint Task Force," presents the most important aspects from two of NATO's crucial summits—the Rome Summit in 1991 and Washington Summit in 1999. According to Rearden, the Rome concept brings a different approach to security matters<sup>36</sup>, which addresses a "transition period, caught between the end of the Cold War and an uncertain future."<sup>37</sup> Reassessing NATO's strategic needs, the Rome Summit demonstrated that beside the main role as a collective defense organization, the newly created security environment asked for a reorganization of priorities and development of new capabilities needed for a rapid and flexible response to different threats to peace and security. Further, he presents two major initiatives adopted by the Rome Summit which will set the conditions for the most significant changes in NATO's structure and policy; the Partnership for Peace program, as a starting point of the enlargement process, and the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.

Analyzing the results of the Washington Summit, Rearden draws the conclusion that in spite of the fall of the defense spending, determined by the end of the Cold War, all NATO member countries agreed that the Alliance was no longer a one-dimensional defense organization and it has to be involved in preservation of peace and stability. Reading the article, one might draw the conclusion that the Washington Summit had several aims among which three of them presented a considerable level of importance and significance for the future changes that were to come within the NATO's policy and

objectives: the development of “crisis response” concept; the establishment of a balance between US and Europe within the Alliance and the involvement of NATO in missions beyond its area.<sup>38</sup>

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, in her article “The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the Twenty-first Century,”<sup>4</sup> addresses issues related to NATO’s contribution to building a secure environment in Europe, the first wave of enlargement and predictions over the second one. She also explains implications of out-of-area activities and NATO’s special relationships with Russia and Ukraine, in a new context defined by NATO’s political and military infrastructure’s changes, together with the challenges presented by the former Warsaw Pact member countries’ security needs.<sup>39</sup> The analysis of all the considerations presented above, drives to the conclusion that in spite of all the internal (US-Europe balance within the Alliance or the role of European capabilities in European security problems), or external (NATO’s relations with Russia, Ukraine or some of the Arab countries) impediments, by redefining its objectives in accordance with the newly created situations and extending collaboration through mechanisms like Partnership for Peace program, without neglecting its core competencies, NATO has demonstrated its capacity to adapt and the relevance as a successful political-military organization.

In *NATO Review*,. “*Examining NATO’s transformation*,” Jonathan Parish makes an interesting presentation of the growing complexity level of different assignments he accomplished within the NATO headquarters, before and after the end of the Cold War, related to the newly created security situation in Central and Eastern Europe, new challenges and threats, such as NATO enlargement process and terrorism or proliferation

of WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction).<sup>40</sup> He examines the transformation process from the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, to the historical decisions taken at the NATO Summit on Prague.<sup>41</sup> Parish concludes that the transformation process is meant to preserve Alliance's relevance and the capabilities to accomplish the roles it wishes to assume.

Determined by the significant changes of the European security picture, envisaged by the London Declaration, restated by the Rome Summit and presented as a necessity by the Washington Summit, NATO's enlargement process has proved to be a controversial subject for many of the historical, political and military analysts. According to the publication titled "European Security Institutions: Ready for the Twenty-first Century?" the enlargement process is seen like a sine qua non condition for promotion of stability in Europe.<sup>42</sup>

It also analyses the rationale of the first wave of enlargement (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were seen as the closest countries to Alliance's integration criteria), but at the same time it presents the important role of a second wave of enlargement, which for strategic rationale, financial and diplomatic efforts and commitment proved in Peace Support Operations, has to include Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states as well, if the Alliance wants to retain its relevance.

According to *The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement*, in January 1994, at the Brussels Summit, NATO member countries agreed that the Alliance was open to membership of other European states, if they will respect and promote the principles of the Washington Treaty and will contribute to security in North Atlantic area. Basically, they will have to demonstrate political and economic democratic reforms, to treat

minorities according to OSCE guidelines, have resolved disputes with neighbors, to prove the ability to make a military contribution to the Alliance and are committed to democratic civil-military relations.

The NATO publication *NATO Today. Building better security and stability for all*, in its chapter “Opening the Alliance to new members” is stating, in the light of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, that the existing members are allowed to invite any European state to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area, and to become a member. Beside the conditions that have to be accomplished by a candidate state, the publication is rising a very challenging question: “Could an Alliance created nearly 50 years earlier, in a totally different international environment, rise to the security challenges of the 21st century?”<sup>43</sup>

A sound and detailed analysis about the relationship between NATO and the former socialist countries, which this author considers very relevant to the topic of this thesis, is developed by Alexandra Gheciu in Robert Schuman Center of the European University Institute. She examines the dynamic and implications of NATO’s socialization of Czech and Romania actors after the end of the Cold War and not only. She claims: “The logic of appropriate action--grounded in a particular definition of shared liberal – democratic identity--played a much more important role than institutional analysis would lead us to expect.”<sup>44</sup>

Erik Yesson, in NATO/EAPC Fellowship Final Report is “Sending Credible Signals: NATO’s Role in stabilizing Balkan Conflicts.” He focuses his study on NATO’s role in Balkan after 1992, where the complexity of the situation has generated successive waves of instability after the Cold War.<sup>45</sup>



Raymond A. Millen, in his essay “ Tweaking NATO: The case for integrated multinational division” , even he specified that his views are not reflecting official policies or positions, is revealing an interesting issue about European countries, defense capabilities and their low participation to multinational operations, comparing with U.S. Armed Forces commitment.

A very interesting point of view, even if does not reflect an official position, is revealed by John Isaacs in the article “NATO expansion: A dangerous policy” in which, besides the cost that USA are supposed to pay for the enlargement process. Mr. Isaacs says that most of the analysts would agree on the fact that motivation for NATO’s expansion, beside European security issues, is to counter a perceived Russian threat in the region.<sup>46</sup> But, in the same time he considers that despite NATO’s expansion is considered to be a deterrent factor, it might aggravate Russia’s fear of foreign invasion and determine some elements in Russia to harbor aggressive impulses.

Given the abundance of ideas and opinions about this topic, one might draw the conclusion that there is nothing more to tell about it, but most of the writers had an approach related to international (regional) security, political or military situation without providing an internal image, from the NATO candidate point of view. Therefore, trying to be as much objective as possible, the author will develop the research process comparing the Membership Action Plan (MAP) countries’ capabilities to accomplish integration conditions, based on criteria presented in NATO and other official publications.<sup>47</sup> This thesis will highlight, as well, the role of the historical aspects, as principal determinants of the integration option and present the problem of enlargement, from a perspective which can bring to the front, that the instability provoked by a

cancellation of NATO's expansion, would have been much more expensive than the process itself.

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<sup>1</sup>Martyn Rady, *Romania in Turmoil* (city, state: I. B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1992).

<sup>2</sup>The Vienna Diktat was considered as an agreement for division of the zone of Eastern Europe between Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union.

<sup>3</sup>For details read, Take Ionescu [article on line, History Take Ionescu web site]; available from: <http://www.geocities.com/mariusdobrin/historytakeionescu.html>; Internet; accessed on 26 September 2005.

<sup>4</sup>Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney, *Fifty Years of American-Romanian relations* (city, state: publisher, 1940-1950).

<sup>5</sup>Janusz Bugajski, *Nations in Turmoil: Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe* (city, state: Westview Press, 1993), 169.

<sup>6</sup>Jeffrey Simon, "Central and East European security: New national concepts and defense doctrines" (Strategic studies, Institute for National and Strategic Studies, 1998) Number 151.

<sup>7</sup>Adina Stefan, "Romania's engagement in sub regional cooperation and the national strategy for NATO accession" (Centre for European Security Studies, 1999) 17.

<sup>8</sup>For details read, *NATO Handbook* [document on-line NATO web site]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/#CH>; Internet; accessed on 26 September 2005.

<sup>9</sup>Ion Calafeteanu, History of Romanians [article on-line Embassy of Romania-Washington, DC, web site]; available from [http://www.roembus.org/english/romanian\\_links/history\\_of\\_romanians.htm](http://www.roembus.org/english/romanian_links/history_of_romanians.htm); Internet; accessed on 29 September 2005.

<sup>10</sup>Dennis Deletant, Cold War International History Project CWIHP, e-Dossier No. 6, [article on-line Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars web site]; available from [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic\\_id=1409](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409); Internet, accessed on 29 September 2005.

<sup>11</sup>CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 5, spring 1995

<sup>12</sup>Deletant, 35.

<sup>13</sup>Alex Alexiev, *Romania and the WARSAW Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1979).

<sup>14</sup>David Turnock, "Romania: Contemporary Geopolitical Perspectives" ( The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe, Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 121.

<sup>15</sup>Rady, 28.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>17</sup>Turnock, 119.

<sup>18</sup>Rady, 28.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 49.

<sup>22</sup>NATO Speeches 1997 [article on Secretary General's welcoming remarks for Romanian President Constantinescu, February 1997, web site]; available from [www.nato.int/docu/speech/sp1997.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/sp1997.htm); Internet; accessed on 29 September 2005.

<sup>21</sup>Liviu Muresan, "Defense reform in Romania: An ongoing process," in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform* (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, Inc., 2002), 307.

<sup>22</sup>Stefan.

<sup>23</sup>Raymond A. Millen, *Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Division* (city, state: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).

<sup>24</sup>Hertzfeld and Rubin, P.C., Attorneys at Law, "*Romania. The case for Romania's accession to NATO.*"

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>"Civic self-assessment of the NATO membership potential" (Institute for Regional Studies-Bulgaria, Latvian Institute of international affairs-Latvia and Slovak foreign policy association-Slovakia, March-June 2002)

<sup>28</sup>Report to Congressional Committees, "NATO enlargement" (United States General Accounting Office, November 2002)

<sup>29</sup>"NATO enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and implications for Defense planning and Shaping," ed. Rand Corporation, 2001

<sup>30</sup>Charles Krupnik, ed., *Almost NATO; partners and players in Central and Eastern European Security* (city, state: publisher, 2003).

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 189.

<sup>32</sup>Since the structure of NATO has been changed for strategic reasons in accordance with different situations, I will not present its today's organization.

<sup>33</sup>David S. Painter, "*The Cold War: An International History*"

<sup>34</sup>The article was publicized in a collection of articles titled "NATO after fifty years" edited by Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay and Mark A. Rubin.

<sup>35</sup>NATO Heads of State and Government took part at the meeting in Washington, DC, on 23-24 April 1999.

<sup>36</sup>The new approach was based on the end of the Cold War and the decreasing Soviet threat.

<sup>37</sup>S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark A. Rubin, eds., *NATO After Fifty Years* (collection of articles)--needs more info

<sup>38</sup>Steven L Rearden, *NATO's Post-Cold War Strategy: The role of Combined Joint Task Force* (NATO after 50 years/ edited by S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, Mark R. Rubin)

<sup>39</sup>Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, *The new NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: Managing European Security in the Twenty-first Century* (Almost NATO. Partners and players in Central and East European security/ edited by Charles Krupnik)

<sup>40</sup>NATO on-line library [article on NATO on-line, Jonathan Parish was senior planning officer in the Policy Planning and Speechwriting Section of NATO's Political Affairs and Security Policy Division web site]; available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/home.htm>; Internet; accessed on 01 October 2005.

<sup>41</sup>Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 6 July 1990, determined by the fact that Central and Eastern Europe was liberating itself.

<sup>42</sup>A publication of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, in association with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

<sup>43</sup>*NATO today* [article on NATO today]; *Building Better Security and Stability for al* web site, NATO office of information and press, 1110 Brussels-Belgium]; available from [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int); Internet; accessed on 1 October 2005.

<sup>44</sup>Alexandra Gheciu, *Security institutions as agents of socialization? NATO and post-Cold War central and Eastern Europe* (Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, 2002).

<sup>45</sup>Erik Yesson, *Sending Credible Signals: NATO's Role in stabilizing Balkan Conflicts* [article on web site, NATO/EAPC Fellowship final report, 2003]; available

from <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/yesson.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 3 October 2005.

<sup>46</sup>World History Archives, “The history of North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [article on web site *NATO in Europe*]; available from <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/60/index-ca.html>; Internet; accessed on 5 October 2005.

<sup>47</sup>One of the MAP’s objectives is to assist aspiring countries for possible future membership.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

In order to provide the necessary information about the NATO integration process, this chapter will consist of an introduction, a review of Alliance membership related issues, the research plan and conclusions. The introduction will present a short overview and will restate the purpose of the thesis.

The fall of the communist block in Central and Eastern Europe was a great opportunity for the former Warsaw Pact member countries to reconsider their security options, looking for agreements by which democratic values could be adopted too. However, it was a big challenge for NATO, to accept them into Alliance for at least two main reasons. First, despite their already expressed willingness to reintegrate old Europe, the members were not certain about the implications of enlargement process for the new security picture. Second, all of the aspirant countries were facing a hard transition period with significant economic and political problems. Regime changes and the liberation of the people brought up serious challenges for newly formed governments. Some of these challenges are economic, ethnic or religious, which in some regions of the south-eastern Europe have exploded in serious conflicts such as: Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania.

This situation, characterized by internal or regional frictions, highlighted the importance of regional stability, which was considered a resolute condition for getting through the transition period. Urgent appropriate measures had to be taken and the best solution appeared to be an Alliance. Under these circumstances, all efforts had to be channeled toward reaching this objective. At the same time, in the early 1990s, NATO

was not ready to accept new members into the Alliance. The main issue was represented by the costs of the enlargement and the implicit additional security responsibilities. Although, all NATO members recognized that the time had come to focus on and emphasize the role of the expansion process.

The promising aspect was that NATO was very interested in promoting and achieving stability in Eastern Europe. Immediate security measures were dictated by the lessons-learned from the conflicts in the Former Yugoslav Republic, where the results of the peace support operations were uneven and far short of expectations; this area can still be a dangerous source of future conflicts. MAP countries saw this as a strong reason for the NATO members to decide to develop an enlargement process. The MAP countries were also encouraged by the acceptance of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999.

This thesis will examine which of the following considerations had the most influence on NATO decision to accept Romania as a full member: the accomplishment of entrance pre-conditions, or geo-strategic reasons. For clarifying this, the research process will be developed based on secondary questions presented in the first chapter.

### NATO Integration Process

Adopted by NATO officials in September 1995, the “Study on NATO Enlargement” stipulated political and security related factors to be taken into account, as well as guidelines for the acceptance of candidate states as full members.<sup>1</sup> Considering that all candidate states from Central and Eastern Europe were former communist countries, with difficult economical, social and political problems, it is easy to realize the necessity of a transition period in which assistance programs would be developed in order to enable the accomplishment of the acceptance conditions. One of these programs was

called the Membership Action Plan (MAP), initiated in April 1999 to provide advice, assistance and practical support for the countries which expressed their will to join the Alliance. This plan has the following main features:

1. The submission of individual annual national programs, covering political, economic, defense, resource, security and legal aspects.
2. A focused feedback mechanism and meetings at NATO Council level to assess the progress.
3. A clearing-house to permit NATO officials and member states to coordinate military assistance for the aspirant countries.
4. The adoption of a defense planning process to include elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.<sup>2</sup>

Following the objectives submitted within their own Annual National Program, the aspirants are expected to achieve certain political and economic goals. From the defense (military) point of view, they have to demonstrate the capability to contribute to the collective defense, for which participation in the Partnership for Peace program is essential. They also have to commit sufficient resources for defense related matters. They have to ensure the security of sensitive information, and they must ensure that domestic legislation does not hinder participation in and commitment to NATO membership.

All of the objectives presented are closely related and will directly influence the accomplishment of the NATO's entrance preconditions. At the end of the preparation phase, each country seeking NATO membership will have to prove that it:

1. It is a functioning democratic, political system based on market economy.
2. Respects the OSCE guidelines regarding treatment of minorities.



3. It has resolved its disputes with its neighbors.
4. It has the capabilities to make a military contribution to the Alliance.
5. It is committed to democratic civil-military relations.

According to NATO publication *The Road to NATO Membership*, there are five steps within the accession process:

1. A series of meetings between NATO experts and individual invitees takes place.
2. Invited countries send to NATO letters of intent to confirm their interest in joining the Alliance and their ability to contribute militarily to NATO operations.
3. NATO member countries sign the accession protocols.
4. After the accession protocols are signed, NATO member countries will ratify, accept, and approve them.
5. The invited countries will deposit their instruments of accession (the United States Department of State is the depository) and will become members of NATO.<sup>3</sup>

### The Research Plan

The research process began with the identification of the problem and establishment of the primary question, Did NATO accept Romania as a full member, based on the accomplishment of entrance preconditions, or based on strategic rationale? With this question to present the overall purpose of the thesis, the next task was to develop a research process based on the division of the primary question into three secondary and several subsequent questions. The abundance of research products and results on NATO related subjects facilitated the analysis of the thesis' main problem. The author's attention was concentrated on finding relevant information about historical

related issues, the situation created in the Central and Eastern Europe, NATO integration process and the necessity of NATO'S enlargement. However, one of the most difficult tasks was to find analysis of the extent in which MAP countries accomplished NATO's entrance conditions.

NATO integration is not only a simple process of accomplishing some preestablished entrance conditions. Just the selection and adoption of certain prerequisites implies a complex analysis of different, specific aspects related to candidates, considering them as a group and each as a separate entity at the same time. The legal basis of NATO's enlargement is Article ten of NATO Charter. The Alliance's initiatives for enabling the accession process are: the Partnership for Peace, the Planning and Review Process, integration steps, the Membership Action Plan and the 1995 Study on NATO enlargement will constitute topics the reader should be familiarized with for a better understanding of the purpose of this thesis.

### Instruments Shaping the Enlargement Process

#### Article 10 of NATO Charter

The significant and unexpected rapid ideological, political, and social changes that emerged by the end of the 1980s in Central and Eastern Europe, together with the regional instability caused by ethnic and religious conflicts, determined NATO members to analyze and reconsider the Alliance's policies, missions and structures. As a result, at the Washington Summit in April 1999 a new strategic concept was adopted, which reflects the new security challenges and NATO's determination to increase cooperation for operations outside the area represented by the members' territories. However, NATO's primary mission is to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence,

and security of its members, which for the newly emerged democracies of Central and Eastern Europe represented one of the most important strategic objectives.

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty provides the legal statutory conditions through which aspirant countries may apply for the security and safety provided by the military Alliance. It states that the members, by unanimous agreement, may invite other states, to become parties to the treaty by respecting NATO principles, contributing to the security of the North Atlantic area and depositing its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America. Reaffirmed at the Brussels Summit in 1994, this article created the necessary conditions for the accession of those nations that could further the Washington Treaty principles.

#### Study on NATO Enlargement

The end of the Cold War created a security situation in Europe that determined NATO to establish a program to facilitate cooperative military relations and to develop a process for enlarging the Alliance. When adopted by the NATO Council in September 1995, the *Study on NATO Enlargement* established the goals of the enlargement process, the general conditions, and the necessary steps for integration.

The first chapter of the *Study on NATO Enlargement* presents the promotion of the principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and compliance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Washington Treaty as the first principles of the enlargement process.<sup>4</sup> Chapter two addresses the contribution of NATO enlargement to stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area as a part of the European security architecture, mainly by developing complementary and mutually reinforcing activities with other European security institutions, such as the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU) and Western European Union (WEU). Chapter three explains the way in which North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and PfP can contribute to the enlargement process. Chapter four establishes directions to be followed and issues to be addressed to ensure that the enlargement process strengthens the effectiveness of the Alliance. These issues include: maintaining the effectiveness of the Alliance to perform its core function and new missions; military and defense implications of the enlargement; Security Investment Program (SIP) and administration and budgets. Chapter five presents the implications of membership for new members, their rights and obligations, and what they need to do to prepare for membership, from the political and military points of view. The last chapter of *Study on NATO Enlargement* presents the modalities by which the enlargement process should proceed, including steps to be followed for NATO integration:

- A decision by the NAC (at an appropriate level) to authorize the Secretary General to inform a country/countries that the Allies are favorably disposed to its/their accession, and to enter into talks with it/them.
- A formal notification from the country/countries to the Secretary General of its/their firm commitment, in accordance with domestic legal requirements, to join the Alliance.
- Detailed consultations with the country/countries concerned about the protocol of accession.
- Approval and signature of the accession protocol by the NAC.
- Ratification, acceptance or approval of the accession protocol by the Allies and entry into force.
- Formal invitation to the country/countries to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.
- Deposition by the country/countries of its/their instrument(s) of accession with the U.S. Government.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, the *Study on NATO Enlargement* established certain entrance conditions to be met by aspirant states, in order to create the necessary foundation for the development of the accession protocols and formal negotiations.

### Partnership for Peace (PfP)

The new security environment created by the revolutions from Central and Eastern Europe countries and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, influenced NATO to adjust its policy and security objectives. At the NATO Summit in London in July 1990, former opponents (Soviet Union and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members) were invited to establish diplomatic liaison with the Alliance. Other initiatives, such as North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) approved at the Rome Summit in 1991 and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, adopted at Brussels Summit in January 1994, were also launched by the Alliance to establish a new security environment and to ensure a free Europe.

PfP is a NATO initiative focused on defense and security related cooperation, with the purpose of enhancing stability and promotion of democratic values throughout Europe. By this initiative, NATO allowed for self-differentiation among partners without assuming extended security responsibilities and created the necessary stability for economic development, which was essential for consolidation of the newly emerged European democracies.

In fact, PfP is a program of bilateral cooperation between every partner state and NATO, developed in accordance with each state's specific individual situation and implemented on conditions agreed to by each participating country. As presented in NATO document releases, the formal basis of the PfP program is the Framework document through which every partner is asked "to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and

arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully.”<sup>6</sup> Transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, democratic control over armed forces and participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, are additional specific commitments that partners must adopt. The Framework Document also discusses the Allies’ commitment to consult with partners who perceive direct threats to territorial integrity, political independence or security.

The PfP program serves also as leverage for partners interested in joining the Alliance, to better prepare themselves for the accomplishment of entrance conditions by developing different activities in accordance with their ambitions and abilities. As a result, an Individual Partnership Program is developed and mutually agreed upon by NATO and each state. This two year program consists of activities focused on defense and security related issues such as: defense reform, defense policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, communications and information systems, and civil emergency planning. The development of these type of activities, together with participation in peace support operations and involvement in other NATO initiatives such as the Planning And Review Process (PARP) have demonstrated the importance of the PfP program in preparing the candidates for future accession.

#### Planning and Review Process (PARP)

In order to identify and evaluate nations’ forces and capabilities available for multinational exercises and operations, the PfP Framework Document commits NATO to developing a planning and review process with the every partner state. PARP is in essence a biennial process in response to a NATO issued survey in the autumn of every

second year through which partners provide information about defense policies, democratic control of the armed forces, national policy relating to PfP cooperation, and relevant financial and economic plans. In accordance with data provided by the partner countries, a Planning and Review Assessment is developed together with a set of Partnership Goals for the purpose of enhancing partners' military capabilities to operate in conjunction with NATO members.

The first and second PARP cycle started in 1995 and 1997. They were based on a set of Interoperability Objectives (IOs). IOs were specific tasks assigned to each nation, tailored to the makeup of their defense forces and the types of forces they offer up for PfP cooperation, in order that their forces are interoperable to the maximum extent possible with the forces of Alliance Nations. IOs were really a subset of a larger group of requirements called Military Interoperability Requirements (MIRs), applicable to all PfP nations and which were a complete shopping list of areas in which the alliance felt that nonalliance nations should strive for interoperability. Each MIR was further broken down into several Military Tasks for Interoperability (MTIs), which were essentially enabling objectives to achieve a given MIR and now are the basic tools for achieving the Partnership Goals (PGs).

New practical mechanisms were also introduced such as Individual Partnership Action Plans, which ensure a comprehensive, tailored and differentiated approach to the Partnerships, and which allow for support to the partners' reform efforts. The summit strongly encouraged partners, including the countries from strategically important regions such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, to take advantage of this mechanism as well as

the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, and to undertake all efforts to combat terrorism.

#### Membership Action Plan (MAP)

The Membership Action Plan is a NATO initiative that comprises a program of activities meant to assist and support the individual needs of countries aspiring to join the Alliance. Launched at the Washington Summit in April 1999, the MAP program was developed using the lessons learned during the accession process of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The decision to consider and to apply the guidance provided by MAP to an aspiring candidate state belongs only to the candidate state. The plan is implemented at the sole responsibility of the country concerned.

The program provides the aspirants with a list of activities from which they may select those most relevant to their specific needs for improvement of capabilities needed to accomplish the entrance conditions. At the same time, an aspiring country's involvement in PfP and Euro Atlantic Partnership Council's (EAPC) mechanisms has a significant contribution to the perception about the candidates' commitment to the work of the Alliance.

As stated in NATO's publication "Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement," MAP's main features are "the submission by aspiring members of individual Annual National Program; a focused and candid feedback mechanism on aspirant countries' progress on their programs that includes both political and technical advice; annual meetings between all NATO members and individual aspirants at the level of North Atlantic Council to assess progress; a defense planning



approach for aspirants which includes elaboration and review of agreed planning targets.”<sup>7</sup>

The enlargement instruments presented above as NATO initiatives will help the reader understand the overall idea about the NATO integration process. Given the complexity generated by the number of NATO initiatives, partners and member countries, the author presents the actual situation of the partnership and its differing levels in figure 5.




Figure 5. NATO Partnership

### The Research Process

The actual research process will consist of three main phases, based on conditions for NATO adherence. The collection and selection of data and information will be developed in the first phase. The second phase will establish methods and criteria for the assessment process and will present the results of the integration conditions accomplishment and analysis of the strategic considerations. In the final phase, collected

data and information will be compared and analyzed, in order to permit formulation of a clear and concise conclusion.

The process of data collection will be developed based on the tertiary questions of the research pyramid. The first tertiary question is related to Romanian society under the communist rule. Considered one of the major handicaps in Romania's efforts to accomplish NATO's entrance conditions, forty years of communism may represent a major reason for Romanian people to take actions in favor of Euro-Atlantic organizations membership. This aspect will address issues such as communist economy, austerity of communist life, and human rights violations.

The second tertiary question will entail the research and analysis of Romania's unique experience within the Warsaw Pact and the resulting implications it had on Romania's relations with western countries during the Cold War period. The Romanian government was unique among the Warsaw Pact because it was reluctant to accept Soviet interference in its internal affairs. It also was reluctant to use military intervention as a solution for solving social unrest problems. These unique aspects of the Romanian government's nonadherence to Warsaw Pact principles later on materialized in the Romanian people's will to join Euro-Atlantic organizations in search of democratic values.<sup>8</sup>

The third tertiary question will consider threats and risks to Romania's security (conflicts in Romania's neighborhood, cessation of NATO enlargement and Russia's opposition to Alliance's expansion), as well as the newly created security environment in Central and Eastern Europe, as a major motive for Romania's interest in NATO membership.

Addressing the questions related to the extent to which Romania was prepared to join NATO, in terms of conditions accomplishment (the second secondary question), will represent the core of the research process. An analysis of NATO candidates' assessment of preparedness for acceptance into the Alliance has demonstrated the difficulty of the evaluation process. However, political analysts have developed methods to determine the measures under which the aspirants have accomplished NATO's preconditions. Though the focus of this work is on Romania's case, a comparison method will be used in order to highlight the position of Romania in an array of MAP states, established in accordance with the level of conditions accomplishment.<sup>9</sup>

As shown previously, NATO's integration conditions address general capabilities that candidates have to present in domains such as: political, economic, relations with neighbors, ethnic minorities, and democratic control of the military and military contribution to the Alliance. These conditions must be met by candidate states in order to prove their preparedness for joining the Alliance. To develop a concrete evaluation, the research process will assess political/democratic conditions and economic development issues using General Accounting Office (GAO) indicators. Defense/military issues will be assessed using T. S. Szayna's method for defense/military related matters.<sup>10</sup> The reasons that influenced the author to use the assessments mentioned above are as follows:

The sources of information for the assessment processes were provided by numerous famous, reliable agencies and rating companies<sup>11</sup> The analyses were developed in 2001 and 2002, right before NATO's Summit in Prague, where seven from the nine MAP states were invited to join the Alliance The mathematical analytical processes provided an objective method to assess aspirants' level of preparedness

The conclusions resulted from the evaluation process were confirmed by the “Report on NATO enlargement” completed by political subcommittee on Central and Eastern Europe for NATO Parliamentary Assembly.<sup>12</sup>

Relations with neighbors, treatment of minority population and democratic control of the military are fairly simple to judge and are considered to be met by all of the MAP states. However, all of these conditions will be addressed in a separate subchapter titled “General information.”

The general method uses the values from Mr. Szayna’s analysis indicators to establish a list of aspirant states according to the extent in which those countries have met the requirements of that specific indicator. For a more relevant presentation of the figures and levels obtained by Romania, each of Mr. Szayna’s or the GAO’s indicators’ analysis results will be transformed to a graphic standardized using a 0 to 10 scale (the lowest situated state will receive two points).

NATO’s political goals require that countries seeking membership develop democratic institutions and live by democratic values and principles. For evaluation of the political/democratic domain, the research process will use GAO’s indicators of assessment of progress toward democracy, which provides the results of two methods developed by Freedom House and European Union (EU).<sup>13</sup> The MAP states are analyzed by Freedom House from two points of view related to democracy: democratic freedom and progress toward democracy. Considering that both NATO and the EU promote and require candidates to exhibit the same democratic values, the EU assessment completes the picture of the political/democratic indicator and provides the necessary data for a composite evaluation.

The evaluation of the level at which candidate states meet NATO criteria in terms of economic liberty will be developed based on GAO's assessment of economic freedom and economic liberalization. For economic freedom GAO presents two studies that produce numerical measures: the Fraser Institute's *Economic Freedom of the World* index, and The Heritage Foundation and *The Wall Street Journal's 2002 Index of Economic Freedom*.<sup>14</sup> The measures of economic liberalization are presented by a numerical assessment developed by Freedom House. The composite evaluation of economic condition accomplishment is realized using the third indicator represented by EU assessment of development toward market economy.

Defense/military prerequisite will be represented by the nations' ability to contribute militarily to NATO. This indicator will be analyzed in terms of defense expenditure and size of military forces. Defense expenditure will comprise of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and GDP per troop in accordance with size of the armed forces as of 2000. Data used by Mr. Szayna are provided by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), World Bank and SIPRI Yearbook. This data will be transformed in a 0 to 10 scale.

After assessing NATO's criteria accomplishment, the research will focus on strategic rationale in order to find an answer to the primary question. Two key indicators express this strategic assessment in terms of the costs and benefits of including a new member into NATO: (1) *strategic position* which refers to the impact a new member will have on NATO's missions and (2) *armed forces* which refers to the extent to which NATO military requirements are met by new members.

*Strategic position* will be assessed in accordance with NATO's focus on the dominant mission of power projection for conflict management and conflict prevention.

The indicators which comprise a country's strategic position are:

1. The ability to project power unhindered in areas of likely contingencies.
2. The creation of interior and easily defensible borders within NATO (and the avoidance of long and exposed borders that need to be defended at added cost).
3. Risks that may accrue from a higher commitment to a new ally.
4. NATO's cohesion and its ability to perform its main missions on the basis of consensus.

One of the conditions for a new member to be a contributor to NATO's power projection is to have adequate armed forces in terms of size and quality. Accordingly, the *armed forces* will be evaluated based on the following two criteria:

The sufficiency of a member's forces for basic deterrence and border defense which will be assessed in number of troop per kilometer of border, compared to NATO's threshold (Hungary--75 troops per kilometer).

The ability of a member's forces to contribute to NATO's power projection missions, measured by quality figures (compared with NATO's floor--Poland with \$14,469/troop), and quantity (threshold--25,000/troop).

The overall assessment of the strategic rationale will be represented by the scores of strategic position and armed forces, combined to complete an evaluation of a candidates' strategic attractiveness. In order to achieve the compatibility between the two indicators, both results will be transformed to a 0 to 10 scale.

## Conclusions

Romania's reasons for seeking Alliance's membership and the level of its preparedness for assuming both advantages and responsibilities will be expressed by the specific historical situation and security issues, and the extent at which Romania met NATO's entrance criteria.

Subsequently, the evaluation of conditions accomplishment will be compared with the results of the strategic attractiveness in order to obtain a rough answer to the primary question. Because a simple comparison of the facts and figures cannot completely express the real situation, this thesis will provide the reader with an analysis and interpretation of products of the research process, considering other factors such as: time, evolution of economy and the international security situation.

It is obvious that the analysis of the NATO entrance conditions accomplishment can not be totally assessed in a mathematical manner. However, the analytical process used in this thesis will emphasize the level of preparedness for acceptance into NATO, in the attempt to establish the determinants of Romania's accession. Therefore, the research process is opened to either a conditions meeting favorable answer, a strategic rationale determinant unique to Romania's acceptance, or to any other option.

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<sup>1</sup>For details read NATO basic texts [article on Study on NATO enlargement web site]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/enl-9502.htm>; Internet; accessed on 5 October 2005.

<sup>2</sup> *Membership Action Plan (MAP)* [article on *Membership Action Plan (MAP)*, NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)66 - 24 April 1999 web site]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>; Internet; accessed on 5 October 2005.

<sup>3</sup>NATO home page [article The Road to NATO membership, Prague Summit: The Road to NATO membership web site]; available from [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/more\\_info/membership.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/more_info/membership.htm); Internet; accessed on 5 October 2005.

<sup>4</sup>For details read NATO basic texts [article on Study on NATO enlargement web site], available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm>; Internet; accessed on 5 October.

<sup>5</sup>“NATO basic texts” [article on Study on NATO enlargement web site], available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm>; Internet; accessed on 5 October.

<sup>6</sup>NATO Topics [ article on Partnership for Peace updated: 25 Jan 2006,, NATO Partnership for Peace web site]; available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>; Internet; accessed on 5 October 2005.

<sup>7</sup>NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 1110 Brussels, Belgium, [ article on *Enhancing security and extending stability through NATO enlargement*, NATO On-line library web site]: available from <http://www.nato.int/>, Email: [natodoc@hq.nato.int](mailto:natodoc@hq.nato.int); Internet; accessed on 9 October 2005.

<sup>8</sup>Russian military interventions in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary.

<sup>9</sup>All the MAP states under considerations for NATO Prague Summit were listed in chapter 1 of this thesis within “Definition of key terms.”

<sup>10</sup>For details, see “NATO enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and implications for Defense planning and Shaping,” ed. Rand Corporation, 2001 and “NATO enlargement,” Report to Congressional Committees, November 2002

<sup>11</sup>Both assessment documents used information provided by Freedom House, SIPRI Yearbook, 2000, The World Factbook 2000, center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, the US National Defense University, the Rand Corporation, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and others

<sup>12</sup>Bert Koenders (Rapporteur), Committee Reports, Political sub-committee on Central and Eastern Europe, [article on Report-NATO Enlargement, NATO Parliamentary Assembly web site]; available from <http://www.nato-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/2001/au-214-e.asp>; Internet accessed on 20 February 2006

<sup>13</sup>Freedom House is a nongovernmental organization that conducts research and promotes human rights, democracy, free market economics, the rule of law and US engagement in international affairs.

<sup>14</sup>The Fraser Institute is an independent Canadian economic and social research and educational organization that works to raise the understanding about economic and social policy. The heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute that promotes conservative public policies that are based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government and individual freedom.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

NATO will be for Romania . . . not only about security. It is also about joining the family of democratic nations, nations with whom we share the same values of freedom and peace; it is about joining the group we belong to.<sup>1</sup>

Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru, 9 January 2004

#### Introduction

In order to answer the primary question of the thesis, the author searched for an analytical evaluation process that could provide concrete evidence about the extent of the preparedness of the NATO candidates for acceptance into the Alliance. Despite the vague and broad entrance terms established by the “Study on NATO enlargement,” political and military analysts used assessment methods developed by rating companies and found solutions to measure the accomplishment of NATO prerequisites. This thesis will develop an analytical process using facts and figures provided by rating companies. The purpose of this analytical process is to compare the results obtained for accomplishment of conditions with those for strategic attractiveness in order to establish which factors present a more convincing rationale for Romania’s acceptance into NATO.

In order to find an answer to primary question, the secondary questions will constitute the framework of the analytical process. Therefore, in the beginning, the analysis will focus on the reasons that led Romania to seek for NATO membership. Three main aspects are considered the most relevant for the analysis of this issue: Romanian society under the communist regime, Romania’s experience as a Warsaw Pact member, and the new European security environment after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The second research question will address how Romania and the MAP states accomplished the NATO entrance conditions. The analysis will develop in four phases, each of them focused on the following prerequisites: general considerations (treatment of minorities, democratic control over the military, and relations with neighbors), political and democratic conditions, economic development and defense/military status.

The last step of the research process will address the final question: What strategic advantages could Romania's acceptance into NATO bring? To answer this question the author will assess and analyze Romania's strategic position and its armed forces.

### Reasons for NATO Integration

The end of the Cold War marked a series of deep and broad transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in terms of regional security and stability. Under these circumstances, the preservation of peace, territorial integrity and independence represent some of the main reasons that might drive a small state to join a military alliance. Taking into consideration Romania's geographic position, its historical territorial disputes and national rivalries with some of its neighbors, one may draw a simple conclusion about Romania's reasons for looking for NATO membership. Besides the obvious need for security, the eventual economical advantages and the benefits of a democratic way of life, the thesis will analyze other reasons that convinced Romania to seek NATO membership. These reasons include the impact of communist rule on the Romanian society, its experience as a Warsaw Pact member, and the new European security environment after the fall of the Soviet Union.

## Romanian Society Under the Communist Regime

After World War II Romania included the Communist Party in the postwar government with direct influence and support coming from the Soviet Union. The Communists forced the Romanian king to abdicate in 1947 and Romania began a long period of communist life. It is difficult to address such a complex aspect in only a few pages, so the focus of this analysis will be on communist economical aspects, the austerity of communist life, and human rights. Written materials about the topics revealed aspects that explained the Romanian people's eagerness for embracing democratic values and their willingness to adopt an efficient market economy.

### Communist Economy

Ceausescu's cult of personality fed by his close henchmen led him to guide the Romanian economy towards unprofitable economic programs and ineffective projects. He ordered the construction of huge steel and petrochemical plants and engaged thousands of workers in the Danube-Black Sea Canal, which demanded redeployment of laborers from agriculture and significant foreign technology imports.<sup>2</sup> The government grossly under funded agriculture despite the export capabilities it possessed and the timid attempts to mechanize it. In order to complete the agricultural works, the army, students and even schoolchildren were sent in the fields to harvest or to hoe.<sup>3</sup> These are only a few aspects that highlight the poor management of natural resources and the development of inappropriate economical programs that were determined by Ceausescu's ideas about the primacy of industry and the importance of centralized control.

However, during the 1950s and 1960s Romanian economy produced one of the highest growth rates and industrial output.<sup>4</sup> During this period, the government exploited

Romanian natural resources and food production in order to gather strong foreign currency. At the same time, it also marked the period in which the communist party, following Ceausescu's personal model of holding as many titles as possible, assumed state functions too, strengthening its control over the economy.<sup>5</sup> As a result, a new 300-member state body was formed--the Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development, chaired also by Ceausescu. This council was responsible for debating and approving state economic plans based on the Soviet model of annual and five-year planning and the same centralized control principle. Officially called the Unitary National Socioeconomic Plan, it used information on current plan accomplishment, resource allocation and recommendations for investments coming from the lowest echelons, which seemed to be logical and achievable. Though, this initiative did not bring an increase in economic efficiency and determined the communist leaders to take drastic measures. The government halted the importation of goods, slashed domestic usage of electricity, and exploited farms and refineries at maximum in order to increase the exports. The foodstuff exports led to severe shortage of bread, meat, and vegetables for the Romanian people while the government encouraged a "scientific" diet as a solution.<sup>6</sup> Despite the drastic cut-off of oil and gas and the usage of hydroelectric power, nuclear power and nonconventional sources, in 1970s Romanian industry was still considered among the least energy-efficient in the world.

However, despite the harsh way of life of the Romanian people and an ineffective and cruel internal policy, the publicly expressed condemnation of Russian external policy brought Romania the Western countries' support. In 1971, Romania became a member of

the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and in 1972 joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Yet the support of these organizations and economical programs could not stop the fall of the Romanian economy. The lack of consumer goods reduced worker enthusiasm and the effectiveness of industrial facilities decreased drastically. As the production of natural resources (oil, coal and natural gas) began to decline, a devastating earthquake in 1977 created chaos throughout the economy. This situation forced Romania to be the second country among the Warsaw Pact members, after Poland, to request rescheduling of its debts, which determined political leaders to find other solution to recover the economical status.

During the 1980s, a new communist principle called “global accord” came into existence. According to this principle, approximately 11,000 managers and bureaucrats were supposed to be remunerated according to the figures from performance reports. As a result, the figures were inflated and the annual and five-year plans became very unrealistic.<sup>7</sup>

Trying to decrease the waste and improve the efficiency of energy industry, in 1985 Ceausescu issued a decree to militarize the system. According to this system, military commanders supervised the production process, which again, did not bring significant changes to the efficiency of the economical system.

Considering these aspects, Ceausescu’s economic thinking, which was deeply rooted in Stalinist beliefs about the primacy of industry and his personality cult, resulted in his decision to pay off the external debts. This decision had an extremely negative influence on both Romania’s economical development and its people’s life. Despite the

influence of support and programs developed with Western countries, the situation in Romania during the communist rule established an environment totally opposed to an effective market economy and burdened the life of the Romanian people.

### Austerity of Communist Life

Considering the aspects presented above, one might draw the conclusion that the ineffectiveness of communist economic politics and programs was the only reason for the austere life of Romanians. In reality, Ceausescu's atheism, level of education and frantic desire for ovations and personality cult corroborated with his visions about the systematization of cities, modernization and civilization seriously affected Romania's social, cultural and religious life. The failures of the communist economic principles brought Romania into high foreign debts, which later burdened the life of the Romanian people even more.

The deprivation of life in 1980s, influenced by Ceausescu's strong desire to repay the national debts was extreme. Food was difficult to obtain (sugar, coffee, cooking oil or citric fruits were rare commodities). The rationing of foodstuffs was the solution for increasing the exports and minimizing the imports. To reduce the use of fuel, the government rationed petrol too and prohibited the use of private cars during the winter ("to prevent accidents" was the explanation). The temperature in factories, offices and even in schools barely reached 44 degrees Fahrenheit. Perhaps the best way to show the hardship of life in Romania during the 1980s is by presenting the monthly rations per person for foodstuff. Each person received only sugar-1 kilo, margarine 50 grams, rice 250 grams, cooking oil 1 liter and pork 1 kilo. Nonetheless, most of the goods (meat, for instance was usually unobtainable) were hard to find and the real price of products was

actually two or three times more. Because of a lack of spare parts or raw materials, the industrial workers could not fulfill the production parameters set in factory's plan; therefore, they were not receiving a full pay packet.<sup>8</sup>

Another aspect which can complete the overall idea about Romanian people's life during the communist regime is represented by modernization and systematization plans. Ceausescu expressed his vision about systematization as early as 1960s and this process began with encouraging, often forcing the peasants to leave their homes and move to urban areas to become industrial workers. At the "Fourth National Conference of the Chairman of People's Council" in March 1988, Ceausescu reiterated the idea of bringing the living conditions of the peasants closer to those of workers in the towns, contributing in this way to *harmonious* development of the country by *homogenizing* the socialist society. According to this vision, in about five years, agro-industrial councils converted the agriculture into systematized units and the socialist farming system encompassed all the agriculture controlling it. To accomplish these objectives, the government planned to demolish about 8000 villages and grouped the remaining 5-6000 villages into 558 agro-industrial centers. The official number of houses projected to be demolished reached 443,000 in a five years span (1986-1990) and projected another 725,000 built (a project very unlikely to succeed). The number of affected people was five to eight million, as the government displaced them from the land and accommodated them in blocks of flats where "there will be little to distinguish one from another anywhere in the country." The living conditions of the people settled in this kind of blocks were often below decency level. Running water above the ground level was hard to find and in many cases, six families had to share one kitchen and bathroom. This situation had significant

implications on agricultural productivity as well. It is easy to understand that it was impossible to keep pigs, goats or poultry in blocks of flats or in the area surrounding them.<sup>9</sup>

Of course, adequate funding had to support these ambitious projects, which was beyond Romania's economical capabilities. The credits coming from the West sustained Ceausescu's schemes but did not decrease the level of deprivation. To overcome the difficulties of repayments, the standard of living was drastically reduced. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the aspects presented above are only a few from a long list of cruel decisions that have deeply affected Romanian people's life.<sup>10</sup>

### Human Rights

Although Ceausescu succeeded in developing good relationships with the West, including with United States, especially in trade, it was a very different situation concerning his internal policy. In particular, human rights issues related to the strict control of the population, civil liberties or freedom of religious beliefs made life by the 1980s very difficult for the average person. As the austere measures became even more severe, the government exported food, oil and all quality goods in order to repay the national debts and the government used violations of human rights as one of the means to control the population.

One of the control measures, established to protect the communist system and Ceausescu's outrageous projects, denied Western countries access to the realities of Romanian society. Despite the implementation of such measures, in March 1989, a letter written by a group of retired communist officials (a former foreign minister, a former general secretary, a former deputy prime minister and others) reached the West. That



letter reported several human rights violations against the constitutional rights of citizens and violations of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The signatories urged for the cessation of systematization programs that destroyed rural villages and forcibly relocated peasant families. Because of the letter, several western governments limited their relations with Romania.<sup>11</sup>

Reports coming from Romania also concerned US Congressmen. According to these reports, dissidents acting against the Romanian government were arrested only because they expressed their opinions. Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney (1991) presented cases of the imprisonment of several intellectuals and clergymen accused of reporting human rights violations to international authorities. More relevant is the decrease in Romanian emigration. The number of people permitted to immigrate to the US and Israel decreased from 659 in 1976 to 221 in 1977.<sup>12</sup>

The relationship between US and Romania during the communist regime remained essentially trade oriented. Romania's foreign policy, which looked for national independence and distanced its relations with Soviet Union, facilitated this relationship. At the same time, internal human rights policies developed by Romanian officials affected the US-Romanian economical relations. Therefore, US officials often analyzed the human rights abuses in order to decide if Romania should keep the Most Favored Nation status or not. In May 1975, Representative Michael Harrington spoke about human rights violations in Romania. He cited from a letter sent by the Christian Mission in Romania that claimed the Romanian government arrested people for distributing Bibles or forced them to pay expensive fines for holding religious meetings.<sup>13</sup>

The implementation of the systematization program led to other serious violations of human rights. In Bucharest during the mid-1980s, the government demolished 26 churches and two monasteries and displaced 40,000 residents for the massive redevelopment of the central area. In their stead, they constructed a boulevard (Victory of Socialism) and “The House of People.” Some sources suggest the cost of “The House of People” reached as high as \$3.3 billion.<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps the reader asks himself about the population’s response to all these abuses. It is obvious that during the communist regime the population voiced its dissatisfaction and expressed it in different kinds of forms. The miner’s strike in the Jiu valley in 1977 and the riots from Brasov in November were among the most important.<sup>15</sup> However, these manifestations of social unrest did not bring any changes to Romanian people’s life due to an extremely efficient oppression apparatus--*Securitate*. The *Securitate* acted as Ceausescu’s private army and managed to keep in check almost the entire population by resorting to physical and psychological coercion. The First Directorate of the *Securitate* was organized in different structures in every county, town or village and was responsible for internal information gathering. The *Securitate* are considered responsible for some of the worst violations of human rights, in which only the psychological pressure exerted on ordinary people exceeded the physical coercion methods. Both the *Securitate*’s actions and the rotation in office of presumable rivals in power prevented an opposition movement from developing in Romania.<sup>16</sup>

The purpose of presenting aspects related to the harsh life of Romanians during the communist regime is not to impress the reader or to support a political point of view. Rather it is to facilitate the understanding of the reasons for which Romanian people was

anxious to embrace the democratic values and way of life by applying for Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, the hindsight presented herein may provide the reader with a justification of Romania's economical capabilities today.

### Romania and the Warsaw Pact

At the end of the Cold War, the Red Army assigned front commanders to head the Allied Control Commissions in each of the occupied countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. By 1949, the Soviet Union had established treaties that prevented all these countries from entering into relations with states hostile to the Soviet Union. These treaties also granted the Red Army the rights to maintain a military presence on their territories, which guaranteed Soviet control in all the countries mentioned above.

The purpose of the treaty between Romania and Soviet Union helped to establish a common defense against Germany or other powers associated with it. At the same time, the treaty marked the first step towards a totalitarian rule, securing the communist regime from any external threats.<sup>17</sup> In April 1948, another step on the road to communism was the adoption of the constitution inspired from the 1936 Soviet one. Other Stalinist norms and practices appeared in June 1948 such as nationalization of industrial, banking, insurance, and mining and transport enterprises. Another communist practice of centralized quantitative planning led to the destruction of Romania's economic base.<sup>18</sup>

At the beginning of the Warsaw Pact, the Hungarian uprising from 1956 demonstrated the loyalty and fidelity of the Romanian political leaders toward the Soviet Union. During the uprising, Romanians were among the Soviets most active allies. However, this situation was not an everlasting one, since eight years later in 1964, the

Romanian leading political class declared their willingness to follow its own way to communism without interference from the outside.<sup>19</sup>

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania marked the first important initiative for following a separate path toward communism and decreasing the Russian influence. According to Dennis Deletant (2004), Emil Bodnaras as Minister of War initiated the process of Soviet troop's withdrawal. During a Soviet leaders' visit in August 1955, Bodnaras boldly suggested that, because Romania was surrounded by socialist countries, there was no reason for Russian troops to be stationed in Romania due to the lack of an external threat against the Warsaw Pact's area of responsibility.<sup>20</sup>

The attempt to distance itself from Soviet Union influence was for Romania not only a courageous act but a dangerous one as well. Therefore, the rift with Moscow had to be done in sequential, active and inactive phases, in order to avoid the threats to Romania's new course. On 3-5 August 1951 in Moscow, Khrushchev presented a plan according to which Romania would be obliged to accept its role as a supplier of raw materials and to abandon its own economic programs. Moreover, affected by Romania's ideological coalition with China against Soviet principles, Khrushchev raised the question of territorial revisions in the Romanian territories of Transylvania and Bessarabia.<sup>21</sup> Considering the previous border disputes Romanians had many times in their history, the Russian approach eroded any cooperative environment that remained within the treaty. Rather it constituted a strong reason for Romania to distance itself further from the Warsaw Pact.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union's communist leaders never stopped believing in and supporting their plan for increasing their influence over the Central and East

European countries. As part of the basic procedure, Soviets assigned trusted people in key positions within both the government and the military apparatus. In order to have an efficient control over the armed forces from partner countries, Russian communist leaders implemented a system based on the Soviet model. Representatives of the communist parties penetrated the East European military establishments and attempted to establish control over the military commanders and to ensure the loyalty of military forces as their main missions. At the same time, the armies were built to support the security and police forces against domestic disorder or other threats to communist political order. Therefore, East European armies implemented political education programs. Under this system, leaders determined the military professional competence to be less important than political loyalty. The main criteria for advancement in military hierarchy was conditioned by appropriate class origin (the working class or peasantry who were unaccustomed to this kind of opportunity), or by demonstrated supporting actions for the communist cause and political leaders. As a result, many officers perceived the professional career linked with the communist party.

The Soviet Union looked for this type of officers. The communist party trusted them and assigned them in important East European command positions, disregarding their low level of competence and military proficiency. Starting in the 1950s political officers served in every military establishment, shared command prerogatives with professional officers and empowered them to evaluate commander's loyalty to the communist rulers. Moreover, a second plan developed by internal security systems backed up the evaluation of loyalty, which they staffed with better-paid officers considered rivals to the personnel from the national armies.<sup>22</sup> Despite the fact that these

measures were meant to support not only the influence of the Soviet Union over the military systems from member states, but the local national political leaders as well, there were significant concerns about the liberty of taking independent decisions in support of national interests. The removal of Khrushchev from the leading position in the Soviet Union in 14 October 1964, offered the Romanian political class an opportunity to consolidate their independence from Moscow. Romania requested the Soviet ambassador on 21 October to withdraw the KGB counselors from Romania. As expected, the Soviet reaction was quick and furious, reiterating the fact that Romania was under the Soviet protective umbrella. The Soviets sent several high ranking political and KGB leaders to Bucharest to tackle the problem. After a series of discussions, the Soviet leadership relented and in December 1964 the KGB counselors withdrew from Romania, making the Romanian security and intelligence services the only agency from the Warsaw Pact members to enjoy the independent status until the end of the communism in 1989. Despite its independence, the collaboration with the KGB never stopped.<sup>23</sup>

Considering the manifested intentions of the Soviet Union to increase its control over all the Central and Eastern European countries and its aggressive external politics against anticommunism social unrest, the relations between the political rulers became more and more distant and antagonistic with the fear expressed by the political leaders from the satellite countries. Therefore, one might draw the conclusion that a certain need for independence expressed by the Warsaw Pact members, among which Romania was the most active, may have been the most significant reason for Romanian leaders to distance themselves from the Soviet Union.

Launching itself on a different path from the one directed by the Soviet leaders, Romania initiated relatively secret relations with the western countries. One of the most significant approaches began in October 1963 when Romania announced to the United States of America its neutrality in case of a war against Soviet Union or its allies. Independent from the Soviet Union's aggressive external politics or not, Romania kept this attitude until the end when the Pact was dissolved in 1991.

Perhaps the most relevant event for determining Romania's position related to its obligations within the Warsaw Pact was the occurrence of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given the tensions generated by that crisis, and trying to avoid entering into a war over the issue of Soviet missiles on Cuba, Romanian Foreign Minister C. Manescu met US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and assured him about the disapproval of Soviet intentions and that in case of a war, Romania would stay neutral. Moreover, when asked about the possible locations of nuclear weapons on Romanian soil, Manescu denied the allegations and invited the United States to verify that fact.<sup>24</sup>

In conclusion, even if remaining a nominal member, Romania neither cooperated in significant military initiatives nor allowed Warsaw Pact troops on its territory. Romania also began developing military relations with non-Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. In this way, Romania discredited the image of Warsaw Pact as a cohesive military alliance and influenced Soviet maneuverability on the Pact's Southeastern flank.<sup>25</sup> It is easy to understand that the Romanian opposition to the Warsaw Pact objectives stems from its reluctance to serve obvious Soviet advantages and from its legitimate will to support national interests, which in many cases were much different from the Soviet ones. Moreover, the communist influence brought Romania in an

extremely difficult economic situation. Communism also separated the Romanian people from the rest of the European states with which it had close relationships prior to the emergence of the communist rule.

### Threats to Stability and Security

Although underpinned by an effective foreign policy focused on Euro-Atlantic integration, Romania's strategic position contributed to the preservation of peace and security in the region. It also generated conflicts of interests that could affect long-term stability in South-Eastern Europe. Therefore, Romania had to cope with specific threats to stability and security, such as conflicts in its neighborhood, and cessation of NATO's enlargement and Russia's opposition to NATO expansion.

### Conflicts in Romania's Neighborhood

Situated at the borders between the Occidental and the Oriental worlds, several security risks threatened Romania's stability such as nationalism, ethnic and religious harassment, terrorism, illegal immigration, drug and arms traffic, organized crime and weak states. The minor conflicts present in Romania's neighborhood threaten not only Romania but the entire region as well.

The ethnic and religious disputes in the Balkans evolved into an open and violent military conflict, for which territorial boundaries could not constitute a serious restraint. While the people from Western Europe might not have found the situation extremely dangerous, the countries neighboring the hostilities were very much concerned about the conflict. The analysis of the situation led to widely expressed opinion that only



multilateral security arrangements under US leadership could ensure the stability of the states from Central and Eastern Europe.

There were several scenarios that could develop based on the conflict on the Balkan Peninsula and none of them provided a secure environment for Romania if the conflict spilled over the borders. Together with Romania's decision to apply for NATO candidacy, this conflict represented the main motives for supporting the military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Based on the good historical relationships Romania and FRY had, Yugoslav officials considered Romanian support for NATO operations as hostile to FRY and declared that good political relations between the two countries could not be developed anymore. Hungary also supported intervention but received no direct reaction from FRY.<sup>26</sup>

The Yugoslav authorities considered Hungary's attitude in a NATO-led operation as a full NATO member normal. Article 5 of the NATO charter represented a strong enough reason for not taking actions against one of the Alliance's members. Thus, it was clear that the different positions FRY had for Romania and Hungary respectively, was determined by the NATO member status presented by the latter. To conclude, since Romania did not integrate into a sound security arrangement, Romania could have entered into a conflict with which it had no direct connections.

#### Cessation of NATO Enlargement and Russia's Opposition

At the 1997 Madrid Summit, Romania and Slovenia were specifically mentioned as the most viable candidates for the next wave of accessions into NATO. Even if the political and economic reforms were completed, there were no guaranties that NATO would admit the two countries as full members. It was clear that the accomplishment of

entrance conditions by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was a process more complex and difficult than both NATO and the candidates had thought.

Under these circumstances it was hard for the not-yet-invited states not to be frustrated for being left out of the treaty, especially because this situation had both external and internal political implications. From the external point of view, Romania was concerned by the fact that Central Europe might have been divided into prepared and unprepared states for Euro-Atlantic integration. The internal concern was determined by the possibility for ultranationalists to gain more population support based on the lack of interest showed by Western countries related to Romania's security issues. Therefore the situation in which Romania found itself from the security point of view was more than difficult. At the same time, NATO members were considering stability in Central and Eastern Europe as a prerequisite for the overall European security environment.<sup>27</sup>

Another significant risk for Romania's security was Russia's opposition to NATO's enlargement process. In 1997, President Boris Yeltsin intended to go on a tour through Central and East European countries which were not yet invited to enter NATO and offer them protection under Russia's security umbrella. Later in November 1998, taking part at a meeting of the Russia-Belarus Union Commission, the Yugoslav deputy prime minister made an astonishing declaration. He stated that Romania, among other states, would join the Russia-Belarus-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Union. Romanian officials promptly rejected these attempts to attract Romania into another Russian led security arrangement. However, the risk presented by the politically active Russia against NATO expansion was still there.<sup>28</sup>

It is obvious that the new security environment formed after the fall of the communism cannot be analyzed nor understood without taking into consideration Russia's role either as a participant to cooperation for security in Europe or as a major challenger to the outcome of the Cold War. Therefore both the European Union and NATO have considered the relationship with Russia extremely important and treated them properly.

The loss of influence in the Central and Eastern Europe, with all military and economical implications have brought Russia to a position it was not used to. From the security point of view, the remnants of the Soviet military capabilities were still enough to keep the balance and annihilate a threat to its national interests. However, in the economical field the situation was different. Soon after the revolutions, all former communist countries from the Central and Eastern Europe were looking for membership with both NATO and the European Union and wanted to cut the ties with anything that could represent communism. Consequently, Russia lost the Central and European economic market as well as its loss of influence in the region.

There is no doubt that Russia's perception of the West in general and of NATO in particular have strong ties with significant historical moments. Invasions from Europe by the Poles and Swedes, Napoleon's and Hitler's will to conquer Russia and terrible material and human losses had a negative impact on the Russian people's perception of the West.<sup>29</sup>

Rooted in history, this perception continued during the Cold War. After the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, Russia was the only major actor in the struggle between capitalism and socialism. Under these circumstances, it is important to note that

most of the Russian policy makers were active in a period of time when there was a hostile view which considered NATO as the core of the ideological enemy.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, after the fall of communism, when the new emerging Russian democracy did not reach the prosperity of the western style society fast enough, the populist politicians began to start up the old animosity.<sup>31</sup>

Serious economical problems, political and social changes, and the loss of influence in Central and Eastern Europe hindered Russia from preserving its major power status. Previously, other countries had to consult Russia on all the worldwide issues. Now, because of the corruption and mismanagement of western financial support, deterioration, fatigue and indifference appeared in Russian-Western relations. Nonetheless, there are opinions that believe a more consistent dialogue between Russia and Western countries might have brought a substantial support to cooperation.<sup>32</sup>

To conclude, the situation created after the fall of communism led Russian politicians to reconsider their position and to accept as de facto Central and Eastern European countries' choice to look for NATO membership. Boris Yeltsin declared that Russia would not object to Poland's integration into NATO, nor would it oppose the admission of all Central Europe. Moreover, he stated to Chancellor Helmut Kohl that Russia was willing to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Despite the absence of consultations with Russia, which showed that its opinion did not count so much anymore, Moscow opposed the integration of the Baltic States into the Alliance. However, Russian approach for development of regional security arrangements did not make a good impression and the Baltic States rejected their approach. As a consequence, in April

2004, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, together with other European states, as well as Romania joined the North Atlantic Alliance.<sup>33</sup>

The complex security situation from the period following the fall of the communist block in Central and Eastern Europe convinced NATO officials to consider the possibility of expansion towards the East seriously. Therefore, except the strategic advantages the new members might have brought, NATO had to develop certain programs to help the aspirants to meet NATO criteria.

### Analysis of Accomplishment of NATO Conditions

NATO's enlargement process was subject for analysis in many of the Alliance's summits, conferences and workshops. The new security environment concerned all the old members but at the same time additional costs for defense expenditures to cover the implied defense responsibilities was not an issue to cast aside.

Consequently, most NATO member governments ordered different rating companies to find measurable indicators for candidate's assessment. This subchapter will present the results from these kinds of assessments and use them to find an answer for the primary question of this thesis. For analytical purposes, less tangible factors like relations with neighbors, treatment of minorities, and democratic control of the military will be considered conditions accomplished and will be presented in the first section. The results of the assessment of political/democratic conditions, economic development and defense/military capabilities will represent the subject for a mathematical (graphical) analysis which will provide a clear picture of the extent at which the MAP candidates (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) did meet NATO's entrance requirements.

## General Considerations

The following analysis provides the assessment of the progress made by Romania toward meeting three of the guidelines provided by *The 1995 Study of NATO*

### *Enlargement:*

1. Democratic-style civil-military relations
2. Treatment of minority population
3. Resolution of disputes with neighboring countries

Since all candidates accomplished all of these conditions and the guidelines are inherently vague, there is no value in analyzing the other MAP states by a comparative method.

### Democratic Control of the Military

Since the fall of the communist regime in Romania the military sector had applied many restructuring programs meant to develop the necessary capabilities in order to become a NATO member. The reform of the Romanian defense started in the early 1990s when the last military minister of defense--General Nicolae Spiroiu stated at a press conference that the next defense minister will be civilian. The defense reform entailed specific measures to insure transition from a political defense structure which served political communist interests, to a politically neutral structure under civil democratic control. The first primary objective of defense reform was depoliticization and stability of the armed forces after the major changes from 1989.<sup>34</sup>

As in the other former communist states from Central and Eastern Europe, there were few civilian Romanian experts in defense issues. Following the assignment of civilians as defense ministers the education of civilians in the realm of military matters

gained considerable importance, so as of 1997 about 35 civilians were trained in National defense Academy.<sup>35</sup>

According to the provisions of Romanian *White Charta of National Defense and Security*, civilian personalities are assigned in following positions:

1. Minister of national defense.
2. State secretary and Chief of the Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy Department.
3. State secretary and chief of department of relations with parliament, legislative harmonization and public relations.
4. Secretary General of the Ministry of National Defense.

The consolidation of civil control over the military was developed in accordance with the following directions:

- Improvement of the organizational management
- Increasing the number of civilians in leading positions
- Development of cooperation and communication between civil and military organizational structures.<sup>36</sup>

The analysis of the facts presented above leads to the conclusion that the defense reform process in Romania was and is still developing on both civil and military dimensions. Civilian personnel issues, organizational structures, and planning staff considerations are addressed in order to assure the democratic control of the military institution.

### Treatment of Minorities

Despite the nationalistic movement promoted during the communist regime, since the revolution in 1989 Romania has been generally successful in providing civil liberties. The constitution protects the rights of national minorities; the state creates the necessary environment for the development of minority groups and expression of their identities without discrimination. The freedom of expression and the promotion of minorities' rights and interests are consolidated by assuring them of representation in the Chamber of Deputies, one of the two houses of Parliament. Under these provisions, 18 minority groups are represented by elected deputies.

However, there were some concerns about the effectiveness of implementation of these laws and related programs. According to sources cited in the US General Accounting Office's Report (2002), Romania's Roma population was subject to discrimination. To address these problems Romania adopted an ordinance establishing a National Council to Prevent and Combat Discrimination. More specifically, in April 2001 the government adopted a long-term initiative, the National Strategy for Improving the Condition of Roma, which outlines a 10 year strategy focusing on the prevention and punishment of all forms of discrimination.<sup>37</sup>

Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk (1997) analyzed the treatment of minority issues in Romania, addressing two of the largest minority communities: Gypsy (Roma) and Hungarians. According to their opinion, Romania is more ethnically homogenous than in 1945 (after the end of WW II) and the minority issues do not seriously affect Romanian societal democratic development.



In order to support one another in their efforts to join Euro-Atlantic organizations, Romania and Hungary established a treaty to facilitate discussions regarding treatment of minorities in both countries. As a result, an assessment developed by the European Union did not reveal significant problems in terms of rights provided for minority communities in Romania.<sup>38</sup>

### Relations with Neighbors

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the diminished prospect of military aggression coming from one of Romania's neighbors did not bring a totally secure environment in South-Eastern Europe. The legacy of the insecure environment left by the Balkan wars, the problems of organized crime and corruption, and the illegal immigration that continues to flow from the Middle East, Asia and post-Soviet states are security concerns which Romania sought to address through positive relationships with its neighbors.

Larry L. Watts (2003) states that despite the religious and ethnical unrest from the region, Romania found peaceful solutions for affected relations by bilateral agreements or within the appropriate international forums. Mr. Watts considers that Romania's decision to join the Euro-Atlantic organization to have significantly contributed to development of proper relations with the states in the region--Hungary, Russia and Moldova in particular.

From a historical perspective, Romania-Russia relations are specifically important, due to the numerous events and circumstances that continuously fostered tense relations between the two states. Whether an adversary or an ally, Russia represented the most immediate and dangerous military threat to Romania. However the changes brought by the fall of the Soviet Union and the interposition of Moldova and Ukraine, lowered the

percentage of the report viewing Russia as a military threat to 10%. This does not mean, though, that the relations between the two countries were improving.

The most important obstacle in mitigating the diplomatic differences was Romania's decision to apply for NATO membership. Under these circumstances, Moscow attempted to persuade Romania to reconsider its position related to security agreements, by using the territorial issue of Moldova, offering to restore the territory in exchange for Romania's neutrality. The complex situation of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova and the Moldovan people's desire for independence was sufficient to influence Romania not to consider this option. As a result, up until 2001, Russia's insistence that Romania renounce its NATO integration efforts hindered the conclusion of a bilateral treaty.

The terrorist attacks against the US from 9/11 constituted a great opportunity for Romania to consolidate its efforts on several levels: administration diplomatic, governmental and parliamentary. Highlighting the importance of unified international efforts in the fight against terrorism, Romanian politicians managed to convince the Russians to admit that Romania's integration into NATO would not negatively impact Russo-Romanian relations. As a result, at the end of April 2002 the bilateral treaty was finished.<sup>39</sup>

The specifics of Romania's relations with Moldova stem from shared cultural and historical ties and from the indisputable fact that the majority of citizens from the two states are the very same people--Romanian. Therefore, when Moldova gained its independence in 1991, most Romanians envisioned German-style unification.

Despite the continuous Russian influence, which supported the Commonwealth of Independent States' interests in the region and illegal border trafficking, the relationship between Romania and Moldova were mainly based on the common culture, history and language.

Adopting a moderate attitude in the face of different attempts to degrade the relations between the two states (some of them, like attributing Moldova's problems to Romanian manipulation, coming even from a president of Moldovan), Romania sought to ameliorate the situation through consultations with the Council of Europe, OSCE, and EU. This Romanian approach offered European forums the opportunity to get a realistic picture of the situation in Moldova. At the same time, the positions of European forums contributed to the conclusion that Moldova poses no military threat to Romania, and the relations between the two states are not antagonistic.<sup>40</sup>

Bilateral relations with Hungary are closely related to the situation of approximately 1.7 million of Hungarians who live within Romania. Historical territorial issues between the two countries and interethnic conflicts occurred especially in Transylvania (the north-western region of Romania), but never hindered the development of normal relationships, both at the citizens level and the official level.

Constituting the main subject in Hungarian-Romanian bilateral relationships, the treatment of Romania's Hungarian minority was properly addressed by both sides. As a result, Romania's approach to ethnic relations is considered as a model throughout Europe. Another situation in which the Romanian politicians ability to address the interethnic issues was decisive for the preservation of good relations between two countries, was represented by the "Law of the status of the Hungarians abroad." Even if

the law was masking revisionism, Romanian officials asked for the help of European commissions and the conflict was peacefully removed, preventing it from affecting bilateral agreements and preserving in this way the stability in the region.

Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk (1997) in their work “Romania and NATO” made a brief analysis of Romania’s relations with its neighbors. Good relationships with its neighbors were supported by Romania’s following bilateral agreements:

- The Basic Treaty with Bulgaria in 1992
- 20-Year Friendship Treaty with Serbia in May 1996
- Treaty with Hungary, September 14, 1996<sup>41</sup>

In conclusion, Romania has worked to establish harmonious and constructive political, economic and security relationships. Driven by the decision to apply for Euro-Atlantic organizations’ memberships and the desire to promote peaceful environment in the region, Romania developed several cooperation programs, contributing to the preservation of stability and security in South Eastern Europe.

#### Political/Democratic Conditions Assessment

Considering that NATO political goals for candidates focus on adoption of democratic values and development of a social environment based on freedom and civil liberties, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), in a report requested by the US President in 2002 related to NATO’s enlargement, presents the results of an analysis developed by Freedom House, and an assessment of the European Union. The EU assessment was developed for seven of the MAP candidates (Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were not candidates for membership in the European Union).

Democratic conditions are reflected by the assessment of democratic freedom, progress toward democracy and EU assessment of its political requirements. A combined graphic result of these three indicators will represent the assessment of political criteria.

### Democratic Freedom

The evaluation of democratic freedom is based on ratings for political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House's method of assessment considers countries as "free," "partially free," or "not free," corresponding with rating values between 1 and 2.5; 3 and 5.5; and 5.5 and 7. Table 1 presents the political ratings for all the nine MAP countries.

Table 1. Freedom House Political Ratings, 2001-2002			
<b>Countries seeking NATO membership</b>	<b>Political rights</b>	<b>Civil liberties</b>	<b>Status</b>
Albania	3	4	Partly free
Bulgaria	1	3	Free
Estonia	1	2	Free
Latvia	1	2	Free
Lithuania	1	2	Free
F.Y.R. of Macedonia	4	4	Partly free
Romania	2	2	Free
Slovakia	1	2	Free
Slovenia	1	2	Free

*Source:* US General Accounting Office, *NATO Enlargement* (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2002), 52.

Table 1 represents the values found for political rights and civil liberties on a 1 to 10 scale. The numbers obtained in this way will represent the values expressed in a 1 to 10 scale, with the lowest value showing the freest country. These values were combined into a single figure and inverted, so that higher numbers would indicate greater levels of

freedom. Figure 6 displays the composite grades obtained by each country for democratic freedom.




Figure 6. Democratic Freedom Grades

### Progress Toward Democracy

The assessment of progress toward democracy is developed by Freedom House and provides evaluation scores for democratization and the rule of law. Based on the results obtained, Freedom house assesses the MAP states as consolidated democracies, transitional governments and consolidated autocracies.

#### Democratization

The evaluated indicators used for assessing the development of democratization are derived from four areas. Table 2 presents Freedom House's scores for these areas (political process, civil society, independent media and judicial frame and corruption), which are awarded on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest level of progress toward democratization.

Table 2. Freedom House Nations in Transit Scores-Democratization Scores, 2002

<b>Countries seeking NATO membership</b>	<b>Democratization score</b>	<b>Political process</b>	<b>Civil society</b>	<b>Independent media</b>	<b>Governance and public administration</b>
Albania	3.94	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.25
Bulgaria	3.00	2.00	3.25	3.25	3.50
Estonia	1.94	1.75	2.00	1.75	2.25
Latvia	1.94	1.75	2.00	1.75	2.25
Lithuania	1.88	1.75	1.50	1.75	2.50
F.Y.R. of Macedonia	4.13	4.50	4.00	3.75	4.25
Romania	3.31	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.75
Slovakia	1.94	1.75	1.75	2.00	2.25
Slovenia	1.81	1.75	1.50	1.75	2.25

*Source:* US General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2002), 53.

The political process score examines national executive and legislative elections, multiparty systems and popular participation in political process. The civil society score is assessed through the evaluation of nongovernmental organizations, the development of free trade unions, and interest group participation in the policy process. The independent media score addresses the state freedom of press, editorial independence, the emergence of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for private citizens. Authority of legislative bodies, decentralization of power, management of local government bodies and legislative and executive transparency are the indicators used for assessing the level of democratization with respect to governance and public administration.

Using the same method as the one for political rights, the grades for democratization awarded for MAP countries are presented in figure 7. Romania scored 5.28 points placing it in seventh place among the MAP states (last place among the countries accepted into NATO).




Figure 7. Democratization Grades

### The Rule of Law

The score for the rule of law stems from the evaluation of constitutional, legislative, and judicial frameworks and level of corruption. Table 3 reflects the results of the assessment of these two indicators utilizing a rating scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of progress toward democracy.

The constitutional, legislative and judicial framework derives from constitutional reform, human rights protection, criminal code reform, the judiciary and judicial independence, and the status of ethnic minorities. Corruption is analyzed through examining corruption in the civil service, business interest of top political leaders, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and anticorruption initiative.



Table 3. Freedom House Nations in Transit Scores – Rule of Law Scores, 2002

<b>Countries Constitutional, seeking NATO legislative, and membership Rule of law scores judicial framework Corruption</b>
Albania 4.88 4.50 5.25
Bulgaria 4.00 3.50 4.50
Estonia 2.13 1.75 2.50
Latvia 2.88 2.00 3.75
Lithuania 2.88 2.00 3.75
F.Y.R. of Macedonia 5.13 4.75 5.50
Romania 4.50 4.25 4.75
Slovakia 2.63 2.00 3.25
Slovenia 1.88 1.75 2.00

*Source:* US General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2002), 54.

The Freedom House scores reflected in table 3 were inverted and transformed on a 1 to 10 scale with 10 representing the best score. Figure 8 shows that Romania received a score of 3.58, occupying seventh place among the candidate states.




Figure 8. The Rule of Low Grades

Given the assessments presented above, Freedom House's interpretation is that six of the MAP states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia) are consolidated democracies, while Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Romania are transitional governments. The graphic presented in figure 9 interprets the evaluation results in the same manner as for political rights and concludes that in the composite assessment of progress toward democracy Romania totals 4.43 points (the seventh place among the NATO aspirant nations).




Figure 9. Composite Assessment of Progress Toward Democracy

The composite assessment of the degree to which each aspirant state meets the political/democratic NATO entrance condition is presented in figure 10, which depicts the mean of results obtained by each aspirant state on the combined assessments of democratic freedom and progress toward democracy. The graphic presented below

concludes that in the composite assessment of political/democratic criteria Romania totals 5.81 points (the seventh position among the aspirant states).




Figure 10. Composite Assessment of Political and Democratic Criteria Preparedness

#### European Union Assessment of Implementation of Political Requirements

The relevancy of the EU assessments stems from the fact that both organizations (NATO and EU) have the same requirements to be accomplished by the candidates in order to become full members. EU assesses the accomplishment of the political requirements through analysis of the stability of institutions, the treatment of minorities, the rule of law and protection of human rights. Table 4 represents the European Union's political assessment for seven of the NATO aspirants, since Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were not official candidates for EU.<sup>42</sup> The data provided regarding EU assessment can not be interpreted graphically, but the information presented (Table 4 EU Political Assessments) is relevant for the research process,

expressing an overall idea about the political progress accomplished by analyzed countries.

Table 4. European Union Political Assessments, 2001

Political assessment, 2001 <sup>43</sup>	
Year	
political criteria	
Country fulfilled Progress made Improvements needed	
Albania N/A	Not currently a candidate for the European Union.
Bulgaria 1997	Bulgaria continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. The country has achieved stability of implementation of the legal framework for institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. the civil service to ensure establishment of Parliament continues to operate smoothly and the legal a professional and impartial civil service. framework for the civil service is largely satisfactory. A strategy for reform of the judiciary has been adopted.
Estonia 1997	Estonia continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. The country has achieved stability in and promotion in the civil service is institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. problematic. Parliament continues to function properly and the civil service and administrative procedures are satisfactory. Reform of the court system and training of judges continues.
Latvia 1997	Latvia continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. The country has achieved stability of the judiciary. institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. Parliament continues to function properly. The need for reform of the judiciary has been endorsed at the highest political level.
Lithuania 1997	Lithuania continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. Progress has been made in reforming the advance the process of reforming and public administration and the judiciary, the legal system reorganizing the public administration. has improved, and the capacity to fight corruption has been strengthened. Reform of the judicial system continues. Law on Courts needs to be adopted.
F.Y.R. of Macedonia	Not currently a candidate for the European Union.
Romania 1997	Romania continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. The country has achieved stability of including measures to further guarantee institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. The independence of the judiciary and to Functioning of the Parliament has improved, and develop a human resource policy for considerable progress has been made in reforming the judges and court staff. judiciary.
Slovakia 1999	Slovakia continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. The country has achieved stability in adoption and a gap remains between institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. policy formulation and implementation. Independence of the judiciary has been strengthened, and progress has been made regarding minority issues.
Slovenia 1997	Slovenia continues to fulfill the European Union's political requirements. The laws on Civil Servants and Public Agencies need to be adopted as an institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law. Important part of the framework legislation The judiciary continues to have a high degree of for public administration reform. independence.

Source: US General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2002), 55.

## Assessment of Economic Development/Market Economy

For the assessment of economic development, which represents one of the NATO acceptance conditions, GAO's Report to Congressional Committees regarding NATO's Enlargement provides two numerical measures of economic freedom. The first one is developed by the Fraser Institute's index (*Economic Freedom of the World*), and the second by The Heritage Foundation and *The Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic Freedom*.

The second indicator for analysis of economic development is represented by economic liberalization for which Freedom House provides ratings from an assessment developed for 27 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former republics from the Soviet Union--*Nations in transit 2002*. The third indicator of economic development is described by the EU assessments of development toward a free-market economy.

### Economic Freedom

The indexes of the Fraser Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and *The Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic Freedom* are based on measures and indicators grouped into areas of economic freedom. The Fraser Institute studied 21 factors which include components that fall into five categories. These categories are:

1. Size of government expenditures, taxes and enterprises
2. Legal structure and security of property rights
3. Sound money
4. Freedom to trade with foreigners
5. Regulation of credit, labor, and business.

The overall score for every country is awarded based on the average of each of these five areas. Scores range from 0 to 10 with 10 representing the country with the freest economy.

The Heritage Foundation and *The Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic Freedom* addressed 50 economic variables belonging to 10 categories of economic factors. The categories are as follows:

1. Trade policy
2. Fiscal burden of government
3. Government intervention in the economy
4. Monetary policy
5. Capital flows and foreign investment
6. Banking and finance
7. Wages and prices
8. Property rights
9. Regulation
10. Black market activity

The overall score is based on the scores obtained for each of the ten areas. The scores provided by the index were transformed by GAO, so that the highest number is given to the country with the freest economy.

Figure 11 displays the ratings provided by both Fraser and Heritage *The Wall Street Journal* indexes for eight of the nine countries seeking for NATO admittance (The Fraser Institute did not rate the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The values presented in the GAO's report, established by the Heritage/*The Wall Street Journal*

ratings range from 0 as the least economic freedom to 4 as the most economic freedom.

The Fraser index rates countries from 0 to 10, with 10 representing the most economic

freedom. Both rating values were rounded and transformed onto a 0 to 10 scale.




Figure 11. Economic Freedom Assessment

The composite assessment of economic freedom is represented in figure 12. The values shown on the chart are the mathematical mean of the ratings provided by Fraser and *Heritage/The Wall Street Journal* indexes. As the graphic reveals, Romania occupies the 8th place with 3.9 points.




Figure 12. Composite Economic Freedom Assessment

### Economic Liberalization

The assessment of economic liberalization presented by GAO was developed by Freedom House within a report called *Nations in Transit 2002*, which provides measures of the progress on economic reforms in 27 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union. The GAO report evaluates economic liberalization based on ratings of privatization, macroeconomic policy and microeconomic policy. Each of these indicators is scored on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of progress. The privatization indicator reflects both the legal framework for privatization, and the stage of the privatization process achieved by the state. The macroeconomic policy rating is based on tax reform, fiscal and monetary policy, and banking reform. The microeconomic policy rating examines property rights, price liberalization, the ability to operate a business, international trade and foreign investment, and the energy sector. Table 5 presents the scores and ratings for all the MAP countries.



Table 5. Freedom House Nations in Transit Scores-Economic Liberalization, 2002

<b>Economic assessments</b>		<b>Component rating</b>			
<b>Countries</b>	<b>Economic seeking NATO liberalization membership</b>	<b>Classification</b>	<b>score</b>	<b>Macroeconomic Privatization</b>	<b>Microeconomic policy</b>
Albania	Transitional economy	3.75	3.25	4.00	4.00
Bulgaria	Consolidated market economy	3.25	3.00	3.00	3.75
Estonia	Consolidated market economy	1.92	1.75	2.00	2.00
Latvia	Consolidated market economy	2.33	2.50	2.25	2.25
Lithuania	Consolidated market economy	2.42	2.25	2.75	2.25
F.Y.R. of Macedonia	Transitional economy	4.67	3.75	3.75	4.25
Romania	Transitional economy	3.92	3.25	4.00	4.00
Slovakia	Consolidated market economy	2.33	2.00	2.50	2.50
Slovenia	Consolidated market economy	2.17	2.50	2.00	2.00

*Source:* US General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement [Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2002], 60.

The scores obtained for economic liberalization were inverted in order to award higher numbers for greater degrees of progress. The evaluation scores obtained in this way were then transformed to a 1 to 10 scale for ease of interpretation. Figure 13 expresses the assessments developed in this way, according to which Romania, with 4.4 points occupies the 8th place.




Figure 13. Assessment of Economic Liberalization

The European Union assesses annually the extent to which countries preparing for EU membership meet the economic requirements for accession. Table 6 presents the EU's assessment of seven of the nine MAP states (Albania and Macedonia are not yet candidates for EU membership). The assessment of development toward a market economy is based on the extent to which the economy is a functioning market-based economy and has the capacity to cope with the economic competition of market forces within the EU.

Table 6. European Union Economic Assessments, 2001

Year determined to have functioning	
Country market economy	European Union economic assessment, 2001
Albania	N/A Not a current candidate for the European Union.
Bulgaria	N/A The European Union determined that Bulgaria is close to being a functioning market economy. Bulgaria should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union in the medium term.
Estonia	1997 Estonia was assessed in 1997 as having a functioning market economy. In 2001, the European Union concluded that Estonia should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union in the term if it continues with and fully implements its reform program.
Latvia	1999 Latvia was assessed in 1999 as having a functioning market economy. In 2001, the European Union concluded that Latvia should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union in the near term if it continues to make further substantial efforts in maintaining the pace of, and completing, its structural reforms.
Lithuania	2000 Lithuania was assessed in 2000 as having a functioning market economy. In 2001, the European Union concluded that Lithuanian should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union in the term if it continues to make further substantial efforts to continue with the vigorous implementation of its structural reform program.
F.Y.M. of Macedonia	N/A Not a current candidate for the European Union.
Romania	N/A The European Union determined that Romania has made progress toward establishing a functioning market economy, although it would not, in the medium term, be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union. The European Union also determined that Romania has taken measures that would allow it to develop its future capacity, provided it continues with economic reform.
Slovakia	2000 Slovakia was assessed in 2000 as having a functioning market economy. In 2001, the European Union determined that Slovakia should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union in the near term if it makes further substantial efforts in medium-term fiscal consolidation and in developing and fully implementing its structural reform program.
Slovenia	2000 Slovenia was assessed in 1997 as having a functioning market economy. In 2001, the European Union determined that Slovenia should be able to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the union in the term if it implements the remaining reforms needed to increase competition in domestic markets.
Source: US General Accounting Office, NATO Enlargement (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 2002), 62.	

The analysis of data presented in the EU assessment confirms the results of the evaluations developed by the Freedom House, Heritage and *The Wall Street Journal* rating companies. According to the EU assessments Romania is in last place among the seven states which in 2004 became officially full NATO members.

The composite assessment of economic development represents the mathematical mean of results obtained for economic freedom and economic liberalization. Figure 14 shows Romania on the last place (8th) with 3.70 points accumulated.




Figure 14. Composite Economic Development Assessment

#### Defense/Military Condition

The candidates' ability to contribute militarily to NATO is assessed by Thomas Szayna based on the values of defense expenditures and the size of the armed forces. Considering the security environment as benign, the assumption is that the level of defense expenditures (as percentages of GDP) will not fluctuate more than 0.2 per year.

Defense expenditure per troop is considered relevant for aspirants' ability to contribute to NATO by providing a rough measure of the technological sophistication of a country's armed forces. For a clear image of how significant the level of defense expenditures is, it is necessary to mention that the most advanced forces spend more than \$100,000US per troop and the NATO European median is at \$93,607 (Italy). Table 7 presents the defense expenditures level for all the nine MAP states.

Table 7. Defense Expenditures; MAP States					
State	Defense Expenditures (in millions Of US\$), 1999	Defense Expenditures As % of GDP, 1998	Peacetime Active Force Size, 2000	Defense Expenditures/ Troop (in US\$), 1999-2000	Defense Expenditures Per Capita (in US\$), 1999-2000
Albania	32	1.1	47,000	681	9
Bulgaria	285	2.5	79,760	3,573	37
Estonia	57	1.2	4,800	11,875	40
Latvia	46	0.7	5,050	9,109	19
Lithuania	124	1.3	12,700	9,764	34
Macedonia	117	2.4	16,000	7,313	57
Romania	541	2.2	107,000	5,056	24
Slovakia	352	2.0	38,600	9,119	65
Slovenia	345	1.5	9,000	38,333	179

*Source:* Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 2001), 57.

Figure 15 presents the number of points awarded to each of the MAP states, in accordance with the values of their defense expenditures. The country with the lowest level of expenditures was awarded two points and the one with the highest level received ten points.

Almost the same figures were presented by Larry L. Watts in an assessment of four (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) of the nine MAP states analyzed herein.<sup>44</sup>




Figure 15. Assessment of Ability to Contribute to NATO

The total composite assessment of the level of preparedness of MAP states for NATO integration represents the extent to which every aspirant met political, economic and military criteria. Figure 16 depicts the points obtained for the mean of all the three indicators presented above.




Figure 16. Composite Assessment of Political, Economic and Military Criteria

#### Analysis of Strategic Attractiveness for NATO

The assessment of the strategic attractiveness presented by candidate states is developed not for establishing which of the aspirants should have been invited, but for determining the strategic rationale of the decision to invite a particular country to join NATO. The strategic assessment process developed by Thomas S. Szayna is based on the analysis of two key issues: *strategic position* and *armed forces*. Strategic position refers to the support the candidate states might bring to NATO's main missions; armed forces refer to the additional requirements for military forces (size and modernization), dictated by the enlargement process.

#### Strategic Position

According to the provisions of its 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO will continue to focus on collective defense of members' territories and on the dominant mission of power

projection for conflict management and conflict prevention. The strategic costs and benefits to NATO from the enlargement process will be assessed along the following dimensions:

1. The ability to project power unhindered in areas of likely contingencies.
2. The creation of interior and easily defensible borders within NATO.
3. Risks associated with a higher commitment to a new ally.
4. NATO's cohesion (consensus for the main missions); transaction costs.

The assessment of how the membership of a specific country will affect NATO's ability to project power is developed based on Alliance's potential benefits for increasing the effectiveness of future operations. For example NATO could become more effective in Balkan missions by adding to its membership Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Macedonia, but probably not from admitting Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia.

The creation of interior national borders within NATO's area of responsibility is considered to be advantageous, in terms of collective defense mission, due to the limitation of the length of exterior borders that need to be defended. On the contrary, long and exposed borders would require an increased need for covering forces.

The potential risks involved in a higher commitment to a new ally can be split into three categories:

1. NATO could be drawn into an otherwise avoidable bilateral dispute.
2. The new commitment would cause NATO to forgo other initiatives (opportunity costs).
3. The Alliance could have a negative impact on the overall security environment.



The implications connected with NATO's growth as it relates to NATO's cohesion are expressed by the increased number of candidates. Simple logic says that, the greater the number of decision makers, the more difficult it will be to arrive at a consensus about a specific situation. Other aspects that can negatively influence NATO's cohesion are related to information management, noncompliance, free-riding and selective participation.

Based on Mr. Szayna's analysis, the assessment is made in accordance with new members' utility to NATO. For power projection a location that would assist operations in the Balkans is coded as high while a location that would not greatly influence NATO's operations in the Balkans will be coded as low. For interior borders, a high grade means that admission of a certain state would lower the costs of collective defense responsibilities. Commitment risks are coded as low for the presence of bilateral disputes (low attractiveness to NATO) and high for their absence. Regarding opportunity costs, a higher score is awarded for efforts to upgrade infrastructure in a country near the Balkans and a lower score for countries elsewhere. In terms of impact on the overall security environment, countries bordering Russia are coded as low. For transaction costs, a high level of preparation for the EU means a high score. Table 8 presents the assessment results for these measures of strategic position.

Table 8. Assessments of Strategic Position: MAP States

State	Power Projection	Interior Borders	New Risks	Transaction Costs	Overall
Albania	High (1)	Low (0)	Mid-high (LHH) (0.7)	Low (0)	Medium (1.7)
Bulgaria	High (1)	Low (0)	High (HHH) (1.0)	Low (0)	Medium (2)
Estonia	Low (0)	Low (0)	Low (LLL) (0.0)	High (1)	Low (1)
Latvia	Low (0)	Low (0)	Low (LLL) (0.0)	High (1)	Low (1)
Lithuania	Low (0)	Low (0)	Mid-low (HLL) (0.3)	High (1)	Low (1.3)
Macedonia	High (1)	Low (0)	Mid-high (LHH) (0.7)	Low (0)	Medium (1.7)
Romania	High (1)	Low (0)	High (HHH) (1.0)	Low (0)	Medium (2)
Slovakia	High (1)	High (1)	High (HHH) (1.0)	High (1)	High (4)
Slovenia	High (1)	High (1)	High (HHH) (1.0)	High (1)	High (4)

*Source:* Thomas S. Szayna, NATO enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 96.

The resulting scores ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 4 on a scale from 0 to 5 which was divided into three sections: 0-1.5=low; 1.6-3.5=medium; 3.6-5=high.<sup>45</sup> The results were then transformed to a 0 to 10 scale for comparison. The assessment presented in Figure 17 shows Romania and Bulgaria in third position with identical scores, significantly behind Slovakia and Slovenia, who both have scores of 10 (the highest possible score).




Figure 17. Assessment of Ability to Contribute to NATO

### Armed Forces

The starting point for the strategic analysis of an aspirant state's armed forces, is understanding the fact that NATO treats all members equally in terms of missions and responsibilities. These responsibilities include each member's ability to defend its own territory (to keep a credible deterrent to aggression by providing an effective initial defense of its own territory). In order to provide a viable contribution to NATO, each of the new members must have adequate armed forces in terms of size, structure and capabilities. Aspirant states' abilities to perform missions of home defense and power projection will be assessed along of the following dimensions:

1. The sufficiency of the state's forces for basic deterrence and border defense.
2. The ability of the state to contribute to NATO's power projection missions.

The ability to contribute to NATO's power projection missions is assessed based on the quality and quantity of the aspiring member's armed forces. The given quantitative indicator is based on the size of active forces, while the quality is expressed by the level

of per troop annual expenditures. Szayna's method uses a matrix which divides aspirants into four categories: (1) countries with large, modernized armed forces, which are considered to be the most attractive and are given a score of 4; (2) countries with large, less-modernized armed forces and countries with small, modernized armed forces, which are given a score of 3; (3) countries with small, less-modernized armed forces, which are given a score of 2; and (4) countries with forces rated as very low on the modernization scale, which are given a score of 1. The quality of armed forces was evaluated using as the threshold the Polish level of defense expenditures (\$14,469 per troop), while for the quantitative assessment, the threshold was the size of Denmark's peacetime forces (25,000).

Deterrence sufficiency is estimated by a rough measure of the ratio of troops per kilometer of border. In this respect countries are coded on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being the least attractive and 4 the most. The assessment is developed in relation with NATO's "floor" level (Hungary with 75 troops per kilometer). Countries with forces equal or greater than the "floor" were coded as high; those with forces 33 percent less were coded as medium-high; countries with forces 33 to 66 less than the "floor" were coded as medium-low; and those with forces less than 25 percent of the "floor" level were coded as low.

Table 9 presents the results of assessment of armed forces (power projection and deterrence). The overall score ranges from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 8 on a resulting 7-point scale which was divided into three sections. The three sections were coded in the following manner: 2-3 = low; 4-6 = medium; 7-8 = high.

Table 9. Assessments of Armed Forces: MAP States

State	Power Projection	Deterrence	Overall
Albania	Low (1)	High (4)	Medium (5)
Bulgaria	Low (1)	High (4)	Medium (5)
Estonia	Medium-high (3)	Low (1)	Medium (4)
Latvia	Medium-low (2)	Low (1)	Low (3)
Lithuania	Medium-low (2)	Low (1)	Low (3)
Macedonia	Medium-low (2)	Medium-high (3)	Medium (5)
Romania	Low (1)	High (4)	Medium (5)
Slovakia	Medium-high (3)	High (4)	High (7)
Slovenia	Medium-high (3)	Low (1)	Medium (4)

*Source:* Thomas S. Szayna, NATO enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping (Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 2001), 98.

Using the same method as for the strategic position, the values awarded by Mr. Szayna, will be transformed to a 1 to 10 scale. The results placed Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia in second place with 6.25 points, following Slovakia which was given 8.75 points (figure 18).




Figure 18. Assessment of Armed Forces

### Composite Assessment of Strategic Attractiveness

The overall evaluation obtained by assessment of the two categories (strategic position and armed forces) provides a complete picture of each of candidate's strategic attractiveness. It is important to note, that Szayna's method considered a geographic position close to the Balkans as more attractive, based on NATO's decision to focus on power projection missions in that area. However, the strategic evaluation presented herein was developed based on the situation before 2004--the year when seven of the nine MAP states were accepted as full NATO members. Changes in the international security picture may have brought implicit changes in NATO's interests in terms of strategic attractiveness. Figure 19 presents the composite assessment of strategic attractiveness, with Romania in third place, having accumulated 5.62 points.




Figure 19. Composite Assessment-Strategic Attractiveness

The research process focused not only on the extent at which Romania accomplished NATO entrance conditions, but on historical and strategic issues as well. The analysis of reasons which determined Romania to seek for NATO membership was developed based on relevant aspects such as: the austerity of the communist life; Romania's experience as a Warsaw Pact member and the threats imposed by the newly created security environment. The presentation of the facts related to the topics presented above will provide the necessary information needed to draw an objective opinion about Romania's motives to join the Alliance.

The results of evaluation process of entrance conditions accomplishment provided sufficient facts and data to be interpreted for the completion of the overall status of Romania compared with the other MAP countries from the second post-Cold War wave of NATO enlargement. The composite assessment of the extent at which Romania met the entrance conditions, based on evaluation of political, economic and military criteria, placed Romania in the seventh place with a mean of 4.50 points accumulated.

On the other hand, the extent of Romania's strategic attractiveness for NATO was expressed by its geographic position related to the Alliance's strategic concerns (the Balkans) and the quality and quantity of its armed forces. The evaluation process presented Romania on the third place, having accumulated 5.62 points. Based on the figures related to conditions accomplishment and strategic attractiveness the final analysis will be presented in the next chapter, in the attempt to find an answer of the primary research question.

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<sup>1</sup>NATO on-line Library, [article on *Video interview with Ambassador Bogdan Mazuru, Head of the Mission of Romania to NATO*, web site]; available from

<http://www.nato.int/multi/video/2004/040109-romania/v040109a.htm>; Internet; accessed on 10 February 2006.

<sup>2</sup> US Library of Congress , [article on “Dynastic socialism and economic downturn” AllRefer.com web site]; available from <http://countrystudies.us/romania/31.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 Apr 2006.

<sup>3</sup>Martyn Rady, “Romania in turmoil” (I. B. Tauris and Co., Ltd, 1992), 63.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>“Dominance of the Romanian Communist Party,” [article [AllRefer.com - Romania - Dominance of the Romanian Communist Party ...](http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/romania/romania93.html) web site]; available from <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/romania/romania93.html>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2006.

<sup>6</sup>US Library of Congress , [article on “Dynastic socialism and economic downturn” AllRefer.com web site]; available from <http://countrystudies.us/romania/31.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2006.

<sup>7</sup>“Dominance of the Romanian Communist Party,” [article AllRefer.com - Romania - Dominance of the Romanian Communist Party ... web site]; available from <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/romania/romania93.html>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2006.

<sup>8</sup>Martyn Rady, “Romania in turmoil” (I. B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1992), 65-66.

<sup>9</sup>Mark Almond, “Decline without fall. Romania under Ceausescu” (Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1988), 13.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>11</sup>US Library of Congress ,[ article on The Ceausescu Era, Romania-The Ceausescu Era web site]; available from <http://countrystudies.us/romania/72.htm> Internet; accessed 3 April 2006.

<sup>12</sup>Joseph F. Harrington and Bruce J. Courtney, “Tweaking the nose of the Russians: Fifty years of American-Romanian relations, 1940-1990” (Columbia University Press, 1991), 420-421.

<sup>13</sup>Ramona Cotca, “The role of Human Rights in American foreign policy:[article on The role of Human Rights in American foreign policy- The Romanian case 1965-1989 web site], available from [www.umich.edu/~historyj/pages\\_folder/articles/The\\_Role\\_of\\_Human\\_Rights\\_in\\_American\\_Foreign\\_Policy.pdf](http://www.umich.edu/~historyj/pages_folder/articles/The_Role_of_Human_Rights_in_American_Foreign_Policy.pdf); Internet; accessed 15 April 2006.

<sup>14</sup>Martyn Rady, “Romania in Turmoil” (I. B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1992), 67.



<sup>15</sup>Mark Almond, “Decline without fall. Romania under Ceausescu” (Institute for European Defense and Strategic Studies, 1988), 17-18.

<sup>16</sup>Martyn Rady, “Romania in Turmoil” (I. B. Tauris and Co., Ltd., 1992), 56-57.

<sup>17</sup>Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu, “Romania and the Warsaw Pact; 1955-1989” (Cold War International History Project, 2004), 2.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>19</sup>Dennis Deletant, Cold War International History Project @ the Woodrow Wilson ... [article on Cold War International History Project e-Dossier Series No. 6, Cold War International History Project web site]; available from [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic\\_id=1409](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409); Internet; accessed 15 April 2006.

<sup>20</sup>Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu, “Romania and the Warsaw Pact; 1955-1989” (Cold War International History Project, 2004), 13-14.

<sup>21</sup>Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu, “Romania and the Warsaw Pact; 1955-1989” (Cold War International History Project, 2004), 16-17.

<sup>22</sup>Glenn E. Curtis, “The Warsaw Pact-Excerpt from ‘Czechoslovakia: A country study’” (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1992), 5-8.

<sup>23</sup>Dennis Deletant and Mihail Ionescu, “Romania and the Warsaw Pact; 1955-1989” (Cold War International History Project, 2004), 18-19.

<sup>24</sup>Raymond L. Garthof, *When and why Romania distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact*, [article on CWIHP Moscow conference on New evidence on Cold war History, 1993, web site ], available from [www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b5a12.htm](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b5a12.htm); Internet; accessed 12 April 2006.

<sup>25</sup>Alex Alexiev, *Romania and the WARSAW Pact: The defense policy of a reluctant ally* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1979).

<sup>26</sup>Adina Stefan, “Romania’s engagement in sub regional cooperation and the national strategy for NATO accession” (Centre for European Security Studies, 1999), 9.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>Hilary d. Driscoll and S. Neil MacFarlane, *Russia and NATO after the Cold War* (Almost NATO, Partners and players in Central and Eastern European security, edited by Charles Krupnik, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 235.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>Nina Khrushcheva, *Russia and NATO lessons learned* (NATO after fifty years, Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001) 230.

<sup>32</sup>Hilary D. Driscoll and S. Neil MacFarlane, *Russia and NATO after the Cold War* (Almost NATO, Partners and players in Central and Eastern European security, edited by Charles Krupnik, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 231.

<sup>33</sup>Nina Khrushcheva, *Russia and NATO lessons learned* (NATO after fifty years, Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001) 233.

<sup>34</sup>Liviu Muresan, “*Defense reform in Romania: An ongoing process*” (“Post-Cold War defense reform,” Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), 307.

<sup>35</sup>Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk, “Romania and NATO: Membership Reassessment at the July Summit” (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National strategic Studies, 1997).

<sup>36</sup>Romanian “White Charta of National Defense and Security” (Romanian Government, 2004).

<sup>37</sup>Report to Congressional Committees, “NATO enlargement” (United States General Accounting Office, November 2002), 44-45.

<sup>38</sup>Jeffrey Simon and Hans Binnendijk, “Romania and NATO. Membership reassessment at the July Summit” (Washington, D.C., National Defense University, Institute for National strategic Studies, 1997).

<sup>39</sup>Almost NATO; partners and players in Central and Eastern European security (edited by Charles Krupnik, 2003), 181-183.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid. 184-185.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid. 185-187.

<sup>42</sup>The EU political assessment was performed in 1997 (1999 for Slovakia) and the reader has to be aware of the fact that many of the problematic issues might have been improved since then. However the ranking of the candidates will still be used for analytical purposes.

<sup>43</sup>*NATO Enlargement* (article on GAO’s Report to Congressional Committees, November 2002, 55, GAO’s Report web site), available from: <http://www.gao.gov> ; Internet; accessed 13 April 2006.

<sup>44</sup>*Almost NATO; partners and players in Central and Eastern European security* (edited by Charles Krupnik, 2003), 172-173.

<sup>45</sup>For detailed explanations see Thomas S.Szayna “NATO enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and implications for Defense planning and Shaping” (ed. Rand Corporation, 2001), 95-96.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study was to examine which of the two factors (accomplishment of NATO entrance conditions or strategic attractiveness) most strongly influenced NATO's decision to admit Romania as a NATO member. The findings of the study suggest that strategic attractiveness was more important. This chapter will summarize and interpret the results of the analysis of NATO integration of Romania by comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries.

The integration of Central European countries within the Alliance required NATO's decision makers to develop an appropriate enlargement process. Several initiatives were developed in order to facilitate the integration process. Among the most important were: a declaration of new Alliance goals (developed at the 1990 London Summit), a new Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (created at the 1991 Rome Summit), and the Study on NATO Enlargement which was completed in September, 1995.

NATO also needed to ensure new member admissions did not negatively impact the Alliance's political principles. The transparency of defense budgeting and force planning, common defense resource management practices and communications, and command and interoperability standards were principles with significant importance in building confidence and developing security among member states, and had to be preserved and promoted. The Study on NATO Enlargement established that new members should:

1. Embrace basic political principles such as democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

2. Promote economic liberty and free market. It outlined the need to adhere to international norms and principles involving treatment of ethnic minorities and social justice.

3. Resolve territorial disputes by establishing good neighbor relations.

4. Establish democratic control of the military.

Accomplishing these conditions significantly contributed to an expanded zone of confidence through security and stability of Europe's Eastern half. It was also extremely important for NATO members to consider how new members might affect the Alliance and its ability to accomplish its level of ambition. Implicitly, the strategic position and capacity for new members to contribute militarily were of utmost importance to the Alliance; the strength of a new member nation's military directly impacted upon enlargement costs. Moreover, the adherence to democratic political and economic principles was as important as the ability to contribute to collective defense. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to determine which of the two following aspects were most important in NATO's decision to accept Romania as a full NATO member: the extent to which Romania accomplished entrance prerequisites, or its strategic attractiveness.

### Conditions Accomplishment

In order to provide a better understanding of Romania's specific situation, the research process started with analysis of the reasons for which Romania applied for NATO membership. Romania's historical background revealed significant territorial disputes, and the fundamental security issues in Romania were a result of its location at

the cross roads of powerful empires and their competing interests. Also, Romania applied for NATO acceptance based on its own recognized need to overcome the legacy of its communist past and embrace the democratic values promoted by Euro-Atlantic organizations. The analysis of Romania then brought forward two other relevant issues: its experience as a former Warsaw Pact member and the emerging threats as a result of the newly created security environment within Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War.

Romania improved its candidacy in terms of democratic control of the military. Its early military transformation, begun in 1991, created the conditions to gradually adapt political control of the military to meet with democratic nation norms. Civilian control over the armed forces was developed through two initiatives: an increased number of civilians assigned to positions within the Ministry of Defense and civilian defense-related training and education. As a result, Romanian armed forces ensured actual civilian control of the military and significantly improved the relations between the Ministry of Defense and the legislative apparatus.

Romania's treatment of ethnic minorities revealed its government generally respects the rights of its citizens. However, some problems exist regarding some societal discrimination against ethnic minorities, especially against Roma. Romania's treatment of its Hungarian minority has been significantly improved as a result of Romanian-Hungarian mutually supporting efforts designed to achieve NATO integration. Most important, with the assistance of foreign experts, Romania clearly outlined a realistic ten-year strategy for improving its Roma minority situation.

Although the analysis of Romania's historical background revealed several territorial disputes and an immediate need for security, Romania's security situation proved to be positive for NATO. Romania initiated regional security agreements which contributed to the preservation of stability in the region. This proved Romania was not simply a potential NATO defense consumer but a source of stability in the Eastern European region. Romania signed a Basic Treaty with Bulgaria in 1992 and a 20-year Friendship Treaty with Serbia in May 1996. It has historical ties with Moldovan people, based on the same nationality (Romanian) with the majority of population from Moldova. Bilateral treaties with Hungary and Russia were signed in 1996 and 2002 respectively. Democratic control of the military, treatment of minorities and relations with neighbors are NATO entrance conditions that are considered to be met by all MAP states analyzed herein.

The political/democratic criteria assessment was based on an evaluation of democratic freedom and progress toward democracy. The results placed Romania in the seventh position with a mean of 5.81 points. Based on these scores and the EU assessment, Romania proved it still needed additional judicial reform; in spite of its continuous efforts toward attaining institutional stability, promoting democracy, and its ability to implement the rule of law, Romania needed to improve significantly. Table 3, outlining Romania's scores for rule of law, judicial framework and corruption, shows that Romania parallels Albania and the Former Republic of Macedonia--countries not accepted in the second post-Cold War wave of NATO enlargement.

The assessment of economic development criteria, given by the economic freedom and economic liberalization evaluations placed Romania in eighth place (last

among the evaluated countries) with 3.70 points. Romania's EU assessment (Table 6) states that even if Romania achieved market economy progress, it will not be readily able to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the union. However, since the date of the EU evaluation, Romania implemented a consistent macroeconomic policy in order to accelerate its privatization and restructuring processes, strengthen financial and banking sector reforms and improve its business environment.

The Romanian defense/military condition assessment was based on the levels of defense expenditures. These expenditures served as a reflection of its military's technological sophistication. The scores presented in figure 15 placed Romania in seventh place among the MAP states with 4 points. Figure 16 depicts the MAP states' overall preparedness for NATO acceptance. Romania's 4.5 total points and its seventh place among MAP states' hierarchy demonstrates that even if Romania met broad-term conditions, these conditions could not serve as strong incentives to NATO decision makers to accept Romania as a full member.

#### Strategic Attractiveness

Romania's strategic attractiveness was evaluated by assessing its geographic position and the attractiveness of its armed forces. Using the provisions of NATO's Strategic Concept, Romania's strategic position was evaluated in terms of its ability to contribute to operations in the Balkan Peninsula (Former Republic of Yugoslavia). In addition, Romania's strategic attractiveness was influenced by its creation of interior and easily defensible borders of the Alliance's Area of Responsibility and by NATO's incurred risks associated with assuming a new ally. The overall score presents a rough measure of where the candidate states stand in relation to NATO in terms of strategic



position and cost-benefit of their membership. Romania placed third in this evaluation, after Slovakia and Slovenia, with 5 total points, on a scale from 1 to 10.

Romania's ability to deter, provide border defense and its ability to contribute to NATO's power projection missions served as criterion by which its armed forces were evaluated. Romania's armed forces attained second place (equal to Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia), with 6.25 total points. Figure 19 outlines Romania's composite strategic attractiveness assessment. Romania resides in third place with a total of 5.62 points.

In order to provide an answer to the thesis' primary question, figure 20 quantitatively portrays Romania's strategic attractiveness and the level at which its ability to achieve NATO's pre-entrance conditions is assessed. Among the accepted states, Romania occupies last place for its pre-entrance conditions accomplishment and third place for its strategic attractiveness. According to these results the conclusion is that Romania's strategic attractiveness served as a more influential reason for its acceptance into the Alliance, than the accomplishment of NATO's stated entrance conditions. It remains important to note the graphical method did not depict the other NATO entrance conditions (relations with neighbors, treatment of minorities, and democratic control of the military). These other areas were considered to be met by all the candidate states.




Figure 20. Comparison Chart (Conditions Accomplishment/Strategic Attractiveness)

### Interpretation of Results

#### Accomplishment of Entrance Conditions

The complexity of the assessment of NATO candidates stems mainly from the broadness of entrance conditions, established in the 1995 study on NATO Enlargement. The fact that bilateral programs are developed, in order to assist the aspirant states in their way toward NATO membership, demonstrates that a standardization of concrete measurable entrance conditions is not one of the Alliance's priorities. NATO decision makers might consider relevant, the status of aspirant states' capabilities, only in terms of what is to be done after the candidate state becomes a full member. Indeed, this assertion

can be supported by actual NATO's objectives related to interoperability and military expeditionary capabilities, which are established for existing members and are currently under further development. Therefore, one might draw the conclusion, that for acceptance into NATO there are no exact concrete conditions to be met. A short overview of Romania's score obtained for accomplishment of economic, political and defense criteria can reveal that these considerations were not decisive for Romania's acceptance into NATO. However, promotion of democratic values and market economy principles, together with certain military contribution to collective defense, are pre-requisites which have to be met by every candidate state, no matter how significant its strategic attractiveness is.

### Strategic Issues

The rational for evaluation of strategic position stemmed from NATO's interest in the conflict from Balkan Peninsula. As shown before, Romania was situated in the third place from the strategic attractiveness point of view.

Even if candidates' geographic position was assessed in relation with conflict from Former Yugoslav republic, NATO's future strategic interests must be addressed. There are, of course other areas of likely contingencies and other threats to security and stability, such as organized crime and terrorism. From this point of view, Romania and Bulgaria (both scored with 5.62 points for strategic attractiveness), would bring significant strategic advantages, especial if they were to be concurrently accepted into NATO. Both countries proved to be loyal partners not only in the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, but in the war against terrorism too. They would strengthen regional stability and democracy and reduce potential for conflict. More over, they would form a bulwark

against the Black Sea region and would provide a contiguous link to Hungary, Turkey and Greece.

These are strategic aspects that must be addressed when an assessment process for candidate states is to be developed. Romania and Bulgaria represents a block with obvious strategic advantages, which might explain their acceptance into NATO. However, the Baltic States which did not present equal strategic attractiveness were all accepted in the very same wave of enlargement.

This might bring to the front, that strategic attractiveness can not be decisive alone, for NATO integration. Indeed, a close look on the comparison chart can reveal that the difference between conditions accomplishment and strategic attractiveness is not significant enough to show which one is to be considered decisive. If none of them taken separately can be considered a significant incentive for NATO decision makers, perhaps the composite attractiveness is the most important criterion.

Figure 21 depicts the mathematical mean of the strategic attractiveness and conditions accomplishment scores. Although, the results portrayed in figure 21 cannot be considered as officially in accordance with NATO's assessment process, they present figures draw from assessments of two relevant characteristics for NATO integration: entrance conditions accomplishment and strategic attractiveness.

Romania's sixth position with 5.06 points (second to last among the accepted candidates), leads to the conclusion that other consideration might have been taken into account for its NATO integration.

### Attractiveness for NATO




Figure 21. Composite Attractiveness for NATO

### Concluding Remarks

The analysis and interpretation of the research process revealed the fact that neither the conditions accomplishment, nor the strategic attractiveness, was the main criteria in assessing the candidates. This leads to the conclusion that other aspects were taken into consideration for Romania's integration into NATO. It is easy to understand that beyond the issues revealed in the evaluation process, some other confidential aspects might have made the difference. However, the analysis developed herein addressed issues which can lead to other considerations such as Romania's status as a Warsaw Pact member and the political aspects.

### Romania as a Warsaw Pact Member

Given the conflict of interests between the two military organizations during the Cold war, the analysis of Romania's behavior within the Warsaw Pact, might be considered as an argument in favor of Romania's acceptance into NATO. However, the characteristic of the new security environment, NATO transformation process and the Global War on Terrorism, determined development of a new type of relations between NATO and Russia. This relation are not connected to COLD WAR tensions anymore, and are not promoting a NATO enlargement process, which might affect Russia's interests. As a result, Romania's status as a former Warsaw pact member can not be considered relevant for its acceptance into NATO.

### Political Considerations

The results of the research process, which did not demonstrate the importance of conditions accomplishment or strategic attractiveness as the main NATO entrance conditions revealed the dual (political and military) characteristic of the Alliance. Considering the low level of relevancy presented by the results of the analysis developed herein, in relation with NATO integration process, one might draw the conclusion that political considerations were decisive for Romania's acceptance into NATO. Aspects, such as development of bilateral relations and discussions between Romania and every NATO member, possible negotiations with strategic or economic implication are very relevant for the topic of this thesis and might be an interesting subject for future research.

Searching for the primacy of conditions accomplishment or strategic attractiveness, in influencing NATO's decision makers to accept Romania as a full member, the analysis brought to the front important aspects for both, NATO members or

candidate states. It presented a point of view from a candidate stance and revealed the complexity of NATO enlargement process.

The analysis of Romania's society under the communist regime or as a Warsaw Pact member revealed aspects which fueled Romanian people's eagerness for seeking NATO membership. Even if the level of conditions accomplishment was not impressive, and the strategic attractiveness, related to current NATO operations was not convincing enough to be considered decisive, Romania's participation in UN/ NATO/ OSCE led operations and its economical, military and political support in GWOT, clearly demonstrated its commitment as a NATO candidate. This aspect, cumulated with Romanian Armed Forces performances in military operations around the world, can be considered as strong incentives in support of Romania's integration into NATO.

#### Recommendations for Further Research

Other important aspects, which were not addressed herein, and which can be considered as interesting subjects for further research, are represented by participation to UN/NATO/OSCE led operations, the interoperability level of the armed forces or the political implications of Romania's non-acceptance into the Alliance. These aspects can be extremely relevant for the analysis of Romania's acceptance into NATO, considering the important contribution of Romanian armed forces in operations all over the world. In these operations, the interoperability level of the military equipment and the training level of soldiers have demonstrated the capabilities and proficiency of Romanian armed forces and Romania's commitment to bring its share in preservation of peace.

As Secretary General Xavier Solana, stated in NATO's Secretary General's Council Welcoming remarks for Romanian President, in February 1997: "Romania was

the first country to join Partnership for Peace and has consistently shown a strong commitment to its cooperation with NATO and with other Partners. We appreciate your active participation in PfP and the restructuring of your military forces to enable joint action with NATOP in a crisis. Also, Romania's participation in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia shows that your country is ready to contribute its share of burden and obligations in creating the Euro-Atlantic security which we all seek.”



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